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ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)
successfully opened the schoolhouse doors to millions of students with
disabilities. But more than forty years after its enactment, the law has proven
largely inept at confronting the educational inequities faced by the many
students with disabilities attending underfunded, high-poverty public
schools. This shortcoming is inconsistent with common conceptions of the
IDEA: Advocates and policymakers alike treat the IDEA’s rights and privately
enforceable remedies as strong, meaningful tools. This Article theorizes that
the IDEA’s under-appreciated failures are overlooked because they are the
products of the law’s internal structure, undue judicial deference to schools,
and litigation that targets procedural injuries rather than substantive
educational practices.
The IDEA’s core procedural rights are meant to guarantee students
with disabilities an appropriate education in the most integrated setting
possible. Yet, in high-poverty schools, virtually none of the law’s promises
are realized. The IDEA’s rights are tethered to an assumption that schools are
operating with an adequate level of capacity and proficiency, but
under-resourced schools lack the ability to ensure either. As a result, the
law’s three core principles—procedural rights, appropriate education, and
integrated settings—are badly diminished for students with disabilities in
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high-poverty schools. Essentially, individual students are unable to leverage
the IDEA’s rights for meaningful remedies, and they are thwarted by courts
when they attempt broader programmatic change. Meanwhile, advocates’
emphasis on enforcing procedural rights merely strengthens the law’s
structural weaknesses. Fulfilling the IDEA’s purpose requires a shift in how
courts and advocates understand the law’s limitations in under-resourced
schools. It also requires a growth in political will to incentivize and fund local
solutions aimed at improved student outcomes. This Article proposes a
framework for such a shift.
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INTRODUCTION
When President Gerald Ford signed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (“EAHCA”) into law, he did so with trepidation,
stating “Unfortunately, this bill promises more than the Federal Government
can deliver, and its good intentions could be thwarted by the many unwise
provisions it contains.” 1 More than forty years, two reauthorizations, and
billions of dollars later, President Ford’s fears seem prescient. Certainly,
momentous gains have been made in the education of children with
disabilities and without a doubt, the legislation forced open schoolhouse
doors and the promise of education for a multitude of students who had
previously been barred. 2 But the EAHCA—now known as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)3—fails a majority of students who
currently attend poorly functioning and under-resourced public schools.
America’s public school students have suffered from decades of
disinvestment. 4 But the country’s dereliction of public education is
inequitably shouldered by low-income students and students of color. 5
1.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975); President
Gerald R. Ford’s Statement on Signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, FORD LIBR. & MUSEUM (Dec. 2, 1975) [hereinafter Ford 1975 Statement],
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/750707.htm
[https://perma.cc/VDW7-96MN].
2.
The United States has progressed from excluding nearly 1.8 million children with
disabilities from public schools prior to the EHA’s implementation to providing more than
7.5 million children with disabilities with special education and related services designed
to meet their individual needs in the 2018–19 school year. A History of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://sites.ed.gov/idea/IDEA-History/
[https://perma.cc/C8YW-W2MF]; see also Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms:
Developments, Lessons, and Prospects, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 1–2 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (describing the inhumane
conditions students with disabilities faced prior to the enactment of the EHA); RUTH
COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT 17–22 (2013) (discussing the shortcomings of the IDEA as it relates to poor
and minority children and suggesting ways in which resources might be allocated more
evenly along class lines).
3.
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).
4.
TCF Study Finds U.S. Schools Underfunded by Nearly $150 Billion Annually,
CENTURY FOUND. (July 22, 2020) [hereinafter TCF Study], https://tcf.org/content/abouttcf/tcf-study-finds-u-s-schools-underfunded-nearly-150-billion-annually/
[https://perma.cc/FN2Z-5ZHG] (“The majority of school districts in the country—7,224 in
total, serving almost two-thirds of all public school students—face a ‘funding gap,’ meaning
that lifting students up to average outcomes requires greater public investment.”).
5.
TCF Study, supra note 4. The inequalities impacting the intersections of race and
poverty have been explored by many scholars. Important work has also shed light on how
racial bias impacts the identification of students with disabilities. This Article does not aim
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School districts that serve predominantly low-income, Black, and Latinx
students receive the fewest state and local dollars.6 Those same districts also
tend to enroll high proportions of students with disabilities, who require
higher levels of funding per pupil. 7 The net result is that schools in these
districts operate with significantly less funding than what is needed to meet
their students’ educational needs.
Unsurprisingly, disinvestment in public schools leads to poor
academic outcomes, particularly for students with disabilities. 8 Students
to disentangle race, poverty, and disability. Rather, its aim is to identify the false
assumptions embedded in the IDEA that prevent it from responding to and remedying
some of these racial-, income-, and disability-based disadvantages. The term “students of
color,” while imperfect, is used in this Article as a shorthand that is broad enough to
capture the different racial and ethnic groups who are impacted by the cross section of
poverty and disability.
6. Low-income school districts are more than twice as likely to have a funding gap as
higher income districts. Id. (“Districts with funding gaps are disproportionately made up
of low-income and Black and Latinx students.”). See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL.,
C.R. PROJECT & CTR. FOR EDUC. & C.R., HARMING OUR COMMON FUTURE: AMERICA’S SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS 65 YEARS AFTER BROWN (2019), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/harming-our-common-futureamericas-segregated-schools-65-years-after-brown/Brown-65-050919v4-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6AU-8PEG] (discussing how racial and economic segregation still
persist 65 years after Brown v. Board and remain unchecked, placing the goal of the
decision at risk); LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, LEARNING POL’Y INST., EDUCATION AND THE PATH
TO ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (2018), https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/
files/productfiles/Education_Path_To_One_Nation_BRIEF.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK5LU9N9] (discussing how trends of poverty and segregation perpetuate education
inequality).
7.
Laura A. Schifter et al., Students from Low-Income Families and Special Education,
CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/students-low-incomefamilies-special-education/ [https://perma.cc/3GT9-B5V3]; JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., CTR.
FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-EXPENDITURE STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES,
1999-2000, at 6 (May 2004), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED522071.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SV8N-U8K9] (reviewing the 1999-2000 special education expenditure
data and finding that average expenditures for a general education student was $6,556
compared to $12,474 for students with disabilities—a difference of $5,918 (90.3%)).
8.
Lex Frieden, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Improving Educational Outcomes for
Students with Disabilities (May 17, 2004), https://ncd.gov/publications/2004/
mar172004 [https://perma.cc/ZK5M-YWUC] (“More than 40 percent of secondary-aged
students with disabilities do not attain a high school diploma, and dropout rates for youth
with disabilities are three to four times higher than dropout rates for youth without
disabilities.”); see also C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effects of School Spending on Educational
and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 20847, 2015) (finding that a 10% increase in per-pupil spending
led to more completed years of education, higher wages, and a reduction in the annual
incidence of adult poverty and that spending increases were associated with sizeable
improvements in school quality, including reductions in student-to-teacher ratios,
increases in teacher salaries, and longer school years).
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attending high-poverty 9 school districts sit in overcrowded classrooms in
antiquated, sometimes hazardous, school buildings.10 Their teachers rarely
have advanced degrees and often lack basic certifications.11 Students in these
schools are less likely to have access to advanced curricular offerings,
laboratories, or even latest-edition textbooks. 12 Students with disabilities
face even greater challenges, since compared to their non-disabled peers
they are more likely to be segregated into lower-achieving classrooms,
subjected to punitive discipline, or pushed out of schools entirely.13
These dismal outcomes are inconsistent with the rich legal rights
afforded to students with disabilities. The IDEA was lauded as a civil rights
victory for students with disabilities because it is steeped in privately
enforceable procedural and substantive rights.14 It ended the days of school
exclusion and promised access to meaningful educational opportunities. 15
More specifically, it called for comprehensive individualized evaluations to
help understand how a child’s disability impacts their learning and the
creation of a detailed plan of special education and related supports to assist
the child in meeting annual academic goals.16 Embedded in those plans is a
substantive right to an appropriate education, defined as “free appropriate

9.
High-poverty, as used here, is meant to mean a majority of students in the school
are from low-income families. The National Center for Education Statistics collects
national level data on public schools and groups public schools into sub-categories based
on the concentration of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch (a proxy measure
for low-income students). The categories are as follows: low-poverty schools (25% or less
of the students eligible for FRPL); mid-low poverty schools (25.1% to 50%); mid-highpoverty (50.1% to 75%) and high poverty (more than 75%). Concentration of Public School
Students Eligible for Free or Reduced Price Lunch, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. (May 2021),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/clb?tid=4 [https://perma.cc/H7V7-2AVS].
10.
DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 4–5 (discussing how poverty and
segregation trends perpetuate education inequality); Fast Facts: Condition of Public School
Facilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., (2012–13 school year), https://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=94 [https://perma.cc/8HFP-49AH] (“53 percent of public
schools needed to spend money on repairs, renovations, and modernizations to put the
school’s onsite buildings in good overall condition.”); see also Complaint ¶ 1, Gary B. v.
Snyder, No. 16-CV-13292, 2016 WL 4775474, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016) (describing
Detroit public schools as having unsafe building conditions, vermin infestations, and a lack
of textbooks and basic classroom materials like paper, pens, and toilet paper).
11.
DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 7–8.
12.
Linda Darling-Hammond, New Standards and Old Inequalities: School Reform
and the Education of African American Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC. 263, 266–68 (2000).
13 .
Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 447 (2001).
14.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2016).
15.
COLKER, supra note 2, at 42.
16.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(d).
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public education” (“FAPE”), and a mandate to educate students with
disabilities in the “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”), meaning with their
non-disabled peers whenever appropriate.17 These rights are miles ahead of
educational rights given to students without disabilities.18 Why, then, has the
IDEA done so little to advance the education of students with disabilities in
high-poverty schools?
Several scholars have highlighted the inequities that come with
accessing the law’s complicated procedural rights. The high cost of attorneys
and experts, unequal bargaining power between parents and schools, and a
hesitancy to disrupt a child’s school-based relationships all undermine lowincome families’ ability to leverage the IDEA.19 This Article theorizes that the
law’s failures cannot be fully explained by these external forces. Rather, they
are a product of the law’s internal structure, courts’ undue deference to
schools, and advocates’ failure to target impact litigation at meaningful
substantive reforms. In other words, the IDEA’s weaknesses do not stem
from secondary circumstances that could be corrected with modest
interventions. The IDEA’s inefficacy is baked into its structure, which is then
reaffirmed by courts’ inability to discern how the law’s utility is limited in
under-resourced schools.
At its core, the IDEA delivers students with disabilities procedural
rights meant to guarantee an appropriate education in the most integrated

17.
Id. § 1412(a)(1), (5).
18.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (“[S]tudents facing suspension and the
consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of
notice and afforded some kind of hearing . . . [T]he timing and content of the notice and the
nature of hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of competing interests
involved.”); see also Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 915, 917 (2016) (“Whittled by a 5-4 Supreme Court majority in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez—as nonfundamental, ostensibly without rank in
the U.S. Constitution—the right [to education] persists explicitly in state
constitutions . . . but has failed to usher in the lasting reforms sought by advocates.”)
(internal citations omitted).
19 .
COLIN ONG-DEAN, DISTINGUISHING DISABILITY: PARENTS, PRIVILEGE, AND SPECIAL
EDUCATION 5 (2009); Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172–73 (2005) (emphasizing the uneven distribution of
special education services); Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External
Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802 (2008) (discussing why many parents
are unable to access IDEA remedies); Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without
Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 132–36 (2011) (discussing how students from low-income
families are unable to access IDEA’s due process remedies); Eloise Pasachoff, Special
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413,
1424–30 (2011) (explaining how low-income families struggle to utilize the IDEA’s
remedies).
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setting possible. Yet, in high-poverty schools, virtually none of the law’s
promises are realized. The IDEA’s rights are rooted in an assumption that
schools are operating with an adequate level of capacity and proficiency, but
under-resourced schools generally lack both.20 So, all three core principles—
procedural rights, appropriate education, and integrated settings—are badly
diminished for students with disabilities in high-poverty schools. Essentially,
individual students are unable to leverage the IDEA’s rights to secure
meaningful remedies and are thwarted by courts when they attempt broader
programmatic change.
The IDEA’s individual remedies are inherently incapable of
providing students the means to achieve the law’s core principles for at least
three reasons. First, courts fail to recognize that the IDEA’s procedural
protections are impaired in high-poverty schools. Instead, they assume that
procedural protections ensure substantive quality and carelessly defer to
schools’ ill-conceived educational programs. 21 In overwhelmed and
under-resourced schools, following procedure does not guarantee adequate
educational programming because the procedures cannot correct
programmatic failures. Requiring that certain people attend meetings cannot
ensure qualified and knowledgeable teachers are present. 22 Requiring
decisions based on a variety of data does not prevent that data from being
flawed. 23 Requiring schools to secure parental consent does not ensure
parental understanding and engagement. 24 In short, guaranteeing process
does not have any real bearing on the quality of a child’s educational
program. Rather, when schools lack the resources needed to assess and
implement specialized instructions and supports, focusing on process is the
equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic—utterly futile. Yet,
courts follow a precedent steeped in the false narrative that adequate
procedures will help guarantee some substantive level of quality when, in
fact, they just ensure a better view of the sinking ship.
Second, the IDEA’s primary qualitative standard—FAPE—requires
a healthy underlying system to function as intended. In high-poverty schools,

20.
BRUCE D. BAKER, LEARNING POL’Y INST., HOW MONEY MATTERS FOR SCHOOLS, at vi
(2017) (“These inequities in funding create dramatically different educational
opportunities for children and contribute to differences in access to key educational
resources—expert teachers, personalized attention, high-quality curriculum, good
educational materials, and plentiful information resources—that support learning at home
and at school.”).
21.
See infra Part II.A.1.
22.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (“Individualized education program team”).
23.
Id. § 1414(a), (b) (“Evaluations, parental consent, and reevaluations” and
“Evaluation procedures”).
24.
Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D) (“Parental consent”).
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such systems generally do not exist, and schools strain to provide adequate
educational programming generally, let alone the highly specialized
instruction required by the IDEA. FAPE is primarily measured by a student’s
progress towards individualized academic goals.25 These goals are derived
in large part from a student’s current academic performance.26 When schools
are unable to deliver quality instruction, both a student’s current
performance and their expectations for future progress are routinely low,
not because the individual student lacks capacity, but because their school
does. Moreover, courts’ ferocious deference to schools’ chosen
methodologies for delivering instruction, regardless of their actual efficacy,
leave students with limited ability to leverage the IDEA for improved
educational programs. 27 Given this precedent, students in high-poverty
schools are stuck with special education programming that has no plausible
prospect of succeeding in the under-resourced environments in which they
operate.
Third, the IDEA’s proscription against segregation, conceptualized
as the LRE requirement, simply does not have the strength to compel
meaningful integration in high-poverty schools. 28 The LRE obligation
requires schools to integrate students with disabilities with their nondisabled peers whenever appropriate. 29 However, underfunded school
25.
Id. § 1401(9) (“Free appropriate public education”); see also Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (“To meet its
substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
26.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3) (“Development of IEP”).
27 .
Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR 210 (Minn. SEA 2009) (finding that
neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations require an IEP to include a specific
methodology or one that would maximize the student’s abilities); A.S. ex. rel. S. v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. App’x 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2014) (ruling that while the parents preferred
for their child to attend an ABA-based program, the student could also receive an
educational benefit from the district’s use of the TEACCH methodology); Carlson v. San
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 380 F. App’x 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that a parent’s
disagreement with the district’s educational methodology was insufficient to establish an
IDEA violation); Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that parents do not have a right to compel a school district to provide a specific
program or employ a specific methodology in providing for the education of a student with
a disability); M.M. ex rel. C.M., 437 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 2006) (ruling that although
the parents argued that auditory-verbal therapy was the best methodology for the student,
the district is only required to provide an appropriate methodology); Matthews v. Douglas
Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 73 IDELR 42 (D. Colo. 2018) (holding that a district did not violate the
IDEA when it used the Wilson Reading System to provide instruction to a high schooler
with dyslexia and other disabilities since some educational methodologies share the same
core instructional approach).
28.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
29.
Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.115.
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districts lack the resources to set up a variety of programs that could support
different types of integration needs.30 As a result, students in high-poverty
schools are more likely to learn in segregated classrooms, rather than
through integrated services that take place in inclusive regular educational
settings.31 Similarly, poorly funded school districts are more likely to set up
centralized services in one school and transfer students in need of those
services to that setting. 32 Thus, a student’s right to be free from
segregation—which the IDEA purports to protect—is constrained by
schools’ and districts’ capacity to fund a variety of options on the continuum
of alternative placements.33
Further, when students with disabilities in high-poverty schools
attempt to achieve programmatic, rather than individual, remedies, they are
thwarted by courts’ heavy-handed use of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause. 34
Although this clause requires that students with disabilities exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing actions in court, Congress and the
Supreme Court have both stated that exhaustion should not be required
where it would be “futile as either a legal or practical matter.” 35 Students
requesting programmatic remedies squarely fall within this exemption
because they seek systemic relief that cannot be awarded through the
administrative process. 36 Yet many lower courts dismiss their cases,
reasoning that because students could have sought individual remedies, the
exhaustion process is not futile.37 Consequently, these courts force plaintiffs
to seek individual remedies through administrative agencies that are
inherently incapable of ordering broad-based programmatic relief.38
Finally, while class action lawsuits hold real promise for substantive
change, too often, well-meaning advocates target systemic claims at

30.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BROKEN PROMISES: THE UNDERFUNDING OF THE IDEA
36 (Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISES], https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/
NCD_BrokenPromises_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NPN-98LF].
31.
Schifter et al., supra note 7.
32.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES,
23–26 (Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS], https://ncd.gov/sites/
default/files/NCD_Segregation-SWD_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/27F9-EQ9W].
33.
34 C.F.R. § 300.115.
34.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
35.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (“[Exhaustion] . . . should not be
required . . . in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical
matter.” (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statements of Sen. Harrison A. Williams)).
36.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (holding that the IDEA’s
exhaustion clause only applies when plaintiffs pursue remedies involving a denial of the
IDEA’s FAPE guarantee).
37.
See infra Part II.B.1.
38.
See infra Part II.B.1.
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procedural issues, leaving the substance up to chance.39 This Article offers an
original analysis of certified and putative class actions in federal courts
during the last fifteen years, revealing an almost singular focus on issues of
process in IDEA class actions.40 Plaintiffs’ allegations involved screening and
evaluation procedures, meaningful access to interpreters, and timely
implementation of related services, among others.41 While such claims are
both necessary and helpful, they do not strike at the heart of the problem for
students in high-poverty schools—improving the educational program itself.
Stated differently, class actions must be directed not just at improved access
to special education services, but at the quality of those services and by
extension, the educational programs in which they operate.
In essence, too many students are trapped in under-resourced,
failing school systems.42 When these students are also identified as having
disabilities, the IDEA is supposed to help shore them up by offering
specialized instruction tailored to meet their unique needs.43 But when the
larger educational program is broken, the IDEA alone cannot fix it.
Fundamentally, the issues outlined in this Article are interwoven with the
decades-old problem of educational inequity. Solutions are within reach, but
they cannot be accomplished without a willingness to sufficiently fund public
schools. The IDEA has never been fully funded.44 When signing the bill into
law, President Ford questioned whether the federal government could ever
deliver on its promised funding.45 In 2019, the federal government covered
less than 15% of its funding obligations towards the IDEA.46 Yet, the law both
assumes and demands a significant level of resources to be effective. 47
Further, evidence demonstrates that school funding matters—particularly
for students of color from low-income families.48
39.
See infra Part II.B.2.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
CENTURY FOUND., CLOSING AMERICA’S EDUCATION FUNDING GAPS (July 22, 2020),
https://tcf.org/content/report/closing-americas-education-funding/
[https://perma.cc/X4HA-Q5H4].
43.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
44.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 18.
45.
“Despite my strong support for full educational opportunities for our
handicapped children, the funding levels proposed in this bill will simply not be possible if
Federal expenditures are to be brought under control and a balanced budget achieved over
the next few years.” Ford 1975 Statement, supra note 1.
46.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44624, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
(IDEA) FUNDING: A PRIMER 8 (Aug. 29, 2019) [hereinafter IDEA FUNDING PRIMER],
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44624.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYX8-TDQ5].
47.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30 (discussing how a lack of funding denies critical
resources to students with disabilities).
48.
Jackson et al., supra note 8.
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This Article suggests three potential solutions to begin to tackle
these inequities. As a first step, fully funding the IDEA would go a long way
to resolving the burdens unjustly placed on the shoulders of low-income
students of color. But since full funding has yet to materialize in the more
than forty years since the law’s enactment, this Article suggests a more
modest and achievable proposal in the form of competitive grants targeting
school districts that serve majority low-income populations.49 Designing a
competitive grant program could target funding towards those districts that
have the highest level of need and incentivize their participation in finding
solutions that work for their particularized challenges. Second, Congress
should amend the IDEA to give the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) the
authority to investigate and litigate systemic violations of the law. Federal
enforcement is necessary to address the inequities embedded in a private
enforcement scheme. But rather than punishing bad actors by withholding
federal dollars, consequences should involve collaborative planning and
oversight towards improved educational outcomes with objectively
quantifiable goals. Finally, advocates must orient class actions towards
substantive educational practices rather than focusing only on process. Such
suits may face a series of obstacles, including, as a starting point, the federal
rules governing class certification.50 Still, class-based litigation has the ability
to force changes directed at substantive educational practices—the surest
way to improve educational outcomes for students with disabilities.51
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the IDEA’s core
principles of FAPE and LRE, describing how the IDEA’s rights and remedies
are tied to the individual, but delivery of those rights exists in a larger
programmatic structure. It then briefly describes the state of public schools,
paying particular attention to high-poverty schools serving a majority Black
and/or Latinx student population. Part II illustrates how each of the IDEA’s
core principles—procedural rights, substantively appropriate education,
and the promise of integration—are gravely weakened when applied to
students with disabilities in high-poverty schools. It then details how courts’
flawed application of the exhaustion clause unjustly prevents students from
accessing crucial systemic remedies. Finally, it analyzes the past fifteen years
of IDEA class actions, uncovering advocates’ focus on procedural claims. Part
III explores three compelling and practical solutions: (1) targeted funding
49.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Nov. 2009)
[hereinafter RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED557422.pdf [https://perma.cc/9APL-4V97].
50.
Pasachoff, supra note 19, at 1456.
51.
Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward a New Role in Promoting Educational
Equity for Students with Disabilities from Low-Income Backgrounds, in HANDBOOK OF
EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 831, 836 (Gary Sykes et al. eds., 2009).
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through a competitive grant-based program, (2) federal, rather than private,
enforcement of the IDEA, and (3) focused class action lawsuits aimed at
substantive educational practices. Part IV concludes.

I. The IDEA in High-Poverty Schools
The IDEA has been lauded as a successful example of civil rights
legislation, in part, because it provides a clear right of action for eligible
children with disabilities and their parents to demand accountability from
their school systems.52 By design, the IDEA’s rights and remedies are rooted
in the individual child.53 Congress was particularly concerned with ensuring
that disability categories did not drive educational programming, but rather
that each individual child’s need would determine the types of services and
supports they would receive. 54 However, an individual child’s educational
program exists as a part of a broader curriculum. When the overall
educational program is healthy, an individual child can leverage the IDEA to
ensure their needs are being appropriately addressed by that program. But,
when the overall system is broken, the IDEA’s remedies are relatively
powerless.
Students with disabilities attending under-resourced, high-poverty
schools face programmatic challenges that strike at the heart of the IDEA’s
structure. The following section first describes the core principles that make
up that structure. It then portrays the challenges faced by students with
disabilities in under-resourced schools to situate the later conversation
regarding the IDEA’s depleted efficacy for those students.

A. The Tension Between Individuals and the Collective
The IDEA was born out of the Civil Rights Movement and is
essentially a civil rights bill for children who have disabilities that adversely
impact their education. 55 Like advocates for racial equality, advocates for
52.
COLKER, supra note 2. For instance, Winkelman noted (1) that Congress’s choice
to allow parents these rights “was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord
with our social and legal traditions,” (2) that the parent-child relationship “is sufficient to
support a[n] . . . interest in the education of one’s child,” and, finally, (3) “Congress has
found that ‘the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective
by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of
such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their
children at school and at home.’” Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,
550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) (citation omitted).
53.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
54.
COLKER, supra note 2, at 33–35.
55.
Id. at 20–26.
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disability rights battled against segregation and fought for the promise of
equal educational opportunity.56
But the IDEA is different from other civil rights legislation in a few
critical ways. The law was enacted under the Spending Clause, promising
states federal funding in return for their agreement to educate students with
disabilities according to the law’s terms and setting up a system in which
states are reliant, in part, on federal funds to ensure compliance with these
terms.57 In addition, the Department of Education (“DOE”) does not have the
authority to investigate individual students’ complaints under the IDEA.
Rather, students with disabilities and their parents are tasked with ensuring
schools live up to the IDEA’s obligations by making use of the statute’s due
process protections.58 In short, the law is privately, not publicly enforced.
The IDEA is entirely focused on the individual student and does not
promise equal educational outcomes. Instead, it offers students with
disabilities a substantive right to free appropriate public education (“FAPE”),
measured using the individual child’s current ability and their expected
capacity for progress.59 However, students highly individualized procedural
and substantive rights 60 exist within a broader educational program. The
IDEA prefers integration of students with disabilities in regular education
classrooms, known as education in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”).
Consequently, tension exists between what is best for the individual student
and what can be provided by the general program.

1. FAPE Is Grounded in the Individual
One of the IDEA’s core principles is that all children with disabilities
are capable and should be held to appropriately high standards. 61 This
principle is captured through the concept of FAPE. Every child who qualifies
for services under the IDEA is guaranteed a FAPE delivered through special
education and related services designed to meet the “unique needs of a child
with a disability.” 62 While the FAPE standard does not require schools to
maximize a child’s potential, it does require more than trivial progress

56.
Id.
57.
20 U.S.C. § 1412; Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
295 (2006).
58.
20 U.S.C. § 1415.
59.
Id. § 1401(9); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.
516, 523 (2007).
60.
See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001
(2017) (describing the rights conferred by the FAPE provision of the IDEA).
61.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5).
62.
Id. § 1401(9), (29); Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 992.
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towards academic goals.63 Moreover, the right to FAPE is conferred through
a federal statute and thus, exists separately from any state constitutional or
statutory duties surrounding public education.64 Thus, the right to FAPE can
confer a more meaningful substantive education than what is guaranteed for
students without disabilities.65
FAPE is conferred through an Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”). 66 The IEP is a document developed by a designated group of
teachers, school officials, parents, and, where appropriate, the child in
question, that describes a child’s current academic and annual goals and the
special education and supported services the child will receive to reach those
goals.67 It is “the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for
disabled children . . . .” 68 Specificity and individualized data are key
components of the IEP.69 IEPs are governed by a detailed set of procedures
which emphasize the need for data that both gauges a child’s current level of
performance and estimates achievable growth for the upcoming academic
year.70 The IEP team is then tasked with using this data as a baseline from
which to write appropriately ambitious annual goals.71
For most children with disabilities, academic goals must be tied to
the regular educational curriculum to ensure that students with disabilities
have the special education and related supports needed to meet state

63.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191
(1982)) (“[A] student offered an educational program providing merely more than de
minimis progress . . . can hardly be said to have been offered an education at
all . . . . [R]eceiving instruction that aims so low would be tantamount to sitting
idly . . . awaiting the time when they were old enough to drop out.” (quotations omitted)).
64.
Id.; Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (“The IDEA offers
federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free appropriate public
education’—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children with certain physical or
intellectual disabilities.”).
65.
For example, South Carolina’s state constitution only provides the right to a
“minimally adequate education.” Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540
(1999).
66.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).
67.
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
68.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
69.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
70.
For instance, every IEP must include “a statement of the child’s present levels
of academic achievement and functional performance,” describe “how the child’s disability
affects the child’s involvement and progress in the general education curriculum,” and set
out “measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals,” along with a
“description of how the child’s progress toward meeting” those goals will be gauged.
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(III).
71.
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
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educational standards for competence in basic subject areas.72 For a minority
of children for whom their disability greatly impacts cognitive functioning,
grade level standards may not be appropriate.73 In these circumstances, IEP
teams must ensure “appropriately ambitious” goals. 74 Once goals are
identified, the IEP team determines the nature and amount of special
education and related services necessary to ensure advancement towards
those goals and then determines placement.75 Placement does not refer to a
particular school, but rather the type of setting where a child will receive the
special educational supports and services. 76 This leads directly into a
discussion of the IDEA’s second core principle, education in the “least
restrictive environment.”77

2. LRE Emphasizes the Collective
While FAPE is often thought of as the centerpiece of the IDEA’s
rights, equally important is the right to an education in the LRE. The IDEA
was enacted in response to the exclusion of children with disabilities from
regular educational settings. 78 From its inception, the law contained a
mandate that students with disabilities be educated in the LRE, meaning that
the law favors the integration of students with disabilities with their nondisabled peers.79 Inclusion, or “mainstreaming,” is an educational term that
refers to the practice of placing students with disabilities in regular
education classes with appropriate instructional support. 80 The LRE
regulation specifically outlines that “special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational
72.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017)
(“Accordingly, for a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typically should,
as Rowley put it, be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and
advance from grade to grade.’” (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191 (1982))).
73.
Students with intellectual disabilities accounted for about 6% of the students
who received special education services under the IDEA during the 2019–20 school year.
Students with Disabilities in Condition of Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. 1 (May
2021) [hereinafter Students with Disabilities], https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/
indicator/cgg [https://perma.cc/T8XK-5P3E].
74.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
75.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
76.
34 C.F.R. § 300.116 (“Placements”).
77.
20 U.S.C. § 1412.
78.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act is the precursor to what is now
the IDEA, and it set forth the principle of inclusion. COLKER, supra note 2, at 6 (“In 1975,
more than 1 million children with disabilities were excluded from public school; today,
virtually no child with a disability is excluded from public school.”).
79.
Id. at 26.
80.
Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
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environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”81 In this way, the IDEA
quite purposefully ties the fates of students with disabilities to the larger
school program.
While inclusion is undoubtedly preferred, it is by no means
mandatory. Instead, the IDEA allows for segregated settings when the
regular education setting, with supplementary supports, is not beneficial.82
As an extension of LRE, IDEA’s regulations require states to commit to
establishing a “continuum of alternative placements.” 83 Essentially, school
districts must offer a variety of placements to ensure every child the
opportunity to be educated in the LRE, or in an environment similar to the
regular education setting. Placement options range from instruction in the
regular classroom with supportive services, pullout instruction to occur
outside of the regular education classroom, separate classrooms within the
same school, separate specialized schools, to residential treatment programs
or hospitals.84
A tension exists between FAPE and LRE. FAPE must be determined
within the context of LRE, meaning that what might be best for the child’s
educational progress must be balanced with what can be achieved in an
inclusive setting. Emotional and social benefits must be considered along
with academic progress.85 These decisions can be particularly difficult when
parents and school officials value academic and social benefits differently.86
Take the example of an elementary school child with severe cognitive deficits
who clearly cannot achieve on grade level with their peers.
School-based members of the IEP team may want to remove the child to a
more segregated environment for all core academic classes and only
integrate the child during extracurricular activities. Parents, on the other
hand, may value peer relationships and acceptance much more than
81.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
82.
Id.
83.
34 C.F.R. § 300.115(a). LRE requires states to ensure that each child with a
disability is educated with children without disabilities “to the maximum extent
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5). When a school district wants to place a child outside of
the general education setting, it must ensure that the general education setting, with
supports and services, is inappropriate, and be able to justify the need for removal from
this setting with individualized data points. Id. § 1412(5)(A)–(B); id. § 1412;
id. § 1414(a)(1)–(2).
84.
Id. § 1414(e); 34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b).
85.
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (involving
a dispute over the segregated placement of a child with Down syndrome who received
minimal academic benefits in the general education setting).
86.
Id.
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academic achievement and may prefer as much time as possible in the
integrated settings.
Because the LRE mandate requires inclusion “to the maximum
extent appropriate,” the decision about what educational setting is most
appropriate is ultimately a subjective judgement, and courts have vacillated
on the strength of the inclusion presumption, with some scholars illustrating
a slight weakening of the presumption over time.87 When the strength of the
LRE requirement was first being litigated, courts generally favored inclusive
settings, if plaintiffs could demonstrate social benefits and were willing to
sacrifice academic achievement for the value of socialization. 88 Recently,
however, the pendulum has swung slightly in the other direction. Several
circuits have upheld schools’ recommendations of segregated settings,
particularly when schools determine that inclusion is detrimental to the
education of other students, or when there is conclusive evidence that an
inclusionary placement will not be successful.89
Decisions regarding placement, where a child is to receive
specialized instruction and other related services, are supposed to be made
by the IEP team, which includes parents.90 But placement is largely a function
of what options are available along the continuum of alternative placements
in any given school district. 91 School districts, and in some cases state
legislatures, are in control of designing and structuring these placements.92

87.
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over?, 114 ED. L.
REP. 1011, 1011 (1997).
88.
Id. at 1014 (“In striking the balance between the benefits of placement in the
mainstream and the need for specialized educational services, these courts approved a
trade-off in favor of mainstreaming only when it was shown conclusively that the student
would benefit from the social facets of mainstreaming.”).
89.
Hartmann ex rel. Hartmann v. Loudon, 118 F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1997); T.R.
v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 575 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a school’s
placement of a child in a hybrid preschool program, involving a half-day preschool class
composed of half disabled children and half non-disabled children, with afternoon
placement in the school's resource room, satisfied FAPE); P. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. P. v.
Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that a school satisfied
LRE when it ensured a student would be in a regular classroom 74% of the time, where
evidence produced during an administrative proceeding demonstrated that education in a
regular classroom, with use of supplemental aids and services, could not be achieved
satisfactorily).
90.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(e).
91.
T.R., 205 F.3d at 579 (“A district that does not operate a regular preschool
program is not required to initiate one simply . . . to create a least restrictive environment
(LRE) opportunity for a disabled child . . . . However, the school district is required to
account [for] a continuum of possible alternative placement options when formulating an
IEP.”).
92.
See infra Part II.A.3.
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Overall education budgets, staffing, and at times, state laws, all impact what
is offered along this continuum.93 School districts determine whether to offer
specialized instruction in the regular setting or pull the child out of the
classroom for those services due to staffing constraints. 94 School districts
also determine how many teachers, school psychologists, behavioral support
staff, and other related service providers are full time at each school, and how
many are itinerant, which impacts caseloads and availability of services.95
School districts often pool resources and expertise to create programs that
specialize in educating students with particular types of disabilities which
allows districts to save money and build on expertise in certain programs.96
When school districts are well-funded and well-managed, they can
structure this continuum of alternative placements to adequately meet the
needs of a range of students with disabilities. But, when school districts are
poorly funded or poorly managed, students with disabilities are less likely to
have the same opportunities for integration. 97 Higher rates of segregation
lead to poorer academic outcomes. 98 Consequently, a school’s wealth will
impact the particular placements it offers, which impacts its ability to ensure
FAPE. Thus, no matter how much the law may value integration, the practical
reality is that district resources limit opportunities for integration. Even
more troubling, as this Article will demonstrate, is that the IDEA fails to offer
meaningful remedies to assist those students who find themselves trapped
in poorly functioning segregated educational programs.

B. The Intersections of Poverty, Disability, and Public Schools
Students with disabilities who attend high-poverty schools confront
educational environments that are particularly poorly suited to meet their
needs. First, schools serving predominantly low-income students operate on
fewer dollars per pupil than other schools. As the Education Trust, a national
nonprofit, finds, these schools on average receive $1,000 less per pupil than

93.
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS, supra note 32, at 24–25.
94.
Id. at 25.
95.
Id. at 34–36.
96.
Letter to Trigg, 50 IDELR 48 (Nov. 30, 2007) (“Although IDEA does not require
that each school building . . . be able to provide all the special education . . . for all types and
severities of disabilities, the LEA has an obligation to make available . . . alternative
placement options that maximize opportunities for its children with disabilities to be
educated with nondisabled peers . . . .”).
97.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 41.
98.
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS, supra note 32, at 37–38.

428

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[53.2

schools serving relatively few low-income students. 99 Second, schools
enrolling predominantly low-income students have greater needs than other
students. 100 Poverty brings with it a host of external difficulties, including
housing instability, health issues, and food shortages which can negatively
impact education. 101 Students living in poverty also often have fewer
resources at home to help support their learning. They may lack access to
computers, internet, study aids, or simply quiet space in which to complete
homework. 102 Studies and federal standards estimate that low-income
students need at least 40% more school resources than their peers to receive
an adequate education—and those estimates are even higher for students
attending schools in concentrated poverty.103
This mismatch between school resources and student need
translates into a funding gap in excess of $10,000 per pupil in many districts
containing high-poverty schools.104 The tangible effects of this funding gap
are clear. Their classrooms tend to be more crowded, their facilities more
dilapidated, and their offerings lower in quality. Staffing, however, may be
their most serious challenge.
High-poverty school districts feel the effects of national teacher
shortages more keenly and struggle to maintain qualified special education
teachers. 105 One recent study indicates that 90% of high-poverty school
districts struggle to staff qualified special education teachers. 106 Highpoverty schools are also lacking in other professional staff like school
psychologists, social workers, behavioral interventionists, and speech

99.
IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER, FUNDING GAPS: AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL FUNDING
EQUITY ACROSS THE U.S. AND WITHIN EACH STATE 6 (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://edtrust.org/resource/funding-gaps-2018/ [https://perma.cc/CR3S-6RDE].
100.
See id. at 7 (estimating that it costs districts at least 40% more to educate
student in poverty than those not in poverty).
101.
James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law,
101 GEO. L.J 1455, 1459 (2013).
102.
Id. at 1486.
103.
THE EDUCATION TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2006, at 6 (2006), https://edtrust.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/FundingGap2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6XD-C7AG].
104.
BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS, app. at 45–50,
https://www.shankerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/The%20Real%20Shame%20of%2
0the%20Nation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L465-KDRB].
105.
See Why Is There a Special Education Teacher Shortage, SCH. EDUC. BLOG (Jan.
12, 2021) [hereinafter Special Education Teacher Shortage], https://soeonline.
american.edu/blog/special-education-teacher-shortage [https://perma.cc/2TZC-5D3G]
(“While the special education teacher shortage affects schools across the spectrum, it tends
to impact high-poverty schools most acutely.”).
106.
Id.
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pathologists,107 all of whom play crucial roles in the success of students with
disabilities. 108 When schools are unable to retain qualified teachers and
employ crucial professional staff, students suffer.109
Third, low-income students with disabilities face serious challenges
in education regardless of where they attend school, but those challenges are
dramatically amplified in high-poverty schools. 110 A National Longitudinal
Study on high school students with disabilities found that while there has
been overall improvement in educational outcomes for students with
disabilities, most of the gains are due to improvements in outcomes of
children from middle- and upper-income homes.111 Gains for students with
disabilities from low-income homes remained largely flat. 112 Professor
Thomas Hehir, former director of the DOE’s Office of Special Education
Programs, theorized a compelling reason for the stagnation: factors that
resulted in improvement for middle- and upper-income students were
simply happening to a lesser degree for low-income students. 113 These
factors include integration, access to challenging academic subjects, early
intervention services, and improved training for general education
teachers. 114 In fact, other data suggests that low-income students with
disabilities are more likely to be placed in substantially separate classrooms
and have less access to high quality teachers and challenging course work
than middle-income students with disabilities, which supports Hehir’s
segregation thesis. 115
107.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 36.
108.
Id. at 13.
109.
See Matthew Ronfeldt et al., How Teacher Turnover Harms Student
Achievement, 50 AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 4, 30–32 (2013); Gary T. Henry & Christopher Redding,
The Consequences of Leaving School Early: The Effects of Within-Year and End-of-Year
Teacher Turnover, 15 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 332, 343 (2020) (finding that losing a teacher
during the school year is linked with losing between 32 to 72 instructional days).
110.
See Hyman et al., supra note 19, at 110; see also Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A
Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement Second-Class Remedial Scheme for LowIncome Children with Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 612–15
(2013) (finding that poverty and disability double the challenges that students face).
111.
LYNN NEWMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SECONDARY SCHOOL PROGRAMS AND
PERFORMANCE OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 16 (2011), https://ies.ed.gov/ncser/pubs/
20123000/pdf/20123000.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TBS-34L5].
112.
Id.
113.
Hehir, supra note 51, at 7.
114.
Id. at 8.
115.
Schifter et al., supra note 7, at 1 (“[A]cross all states, descriptively, students
from low-income families had about twice or more than twice the identification rate with
emotional disability or intellectual disability as compared to non-low-income children.”
With the exception of a few, “in nearly every case . . . of intellectual disability, students from
low-income families had twice (or more) the rate of placement in substantially separate
classrooms than non-low-income students.”).
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These challenges only increase in high-poverty schools. The specific
programmatic changes that students with disabilities need—access to highquality teachers, evidence-based reading programs, early intervention
services, and the opportunity to learn in an inclusive setting with peers—are
a heavier lift, in part, because they speak to deficiencies in the overall
education program in these schools, not just the special education program.
Thus, students with disabilities face two major educational challenges: those
related to their individual disability and those related to their school’s
structural disadvantage. The IDEA becomes powerless because it cannot fix
the first set of challenges without also fixing the second. But the statute itself,
and courts’ interpretation of it, whittle away its usefulness by stripping the
law of its power to challenge the second. 116 While other scholars have
illustrated the inequity inherent in the IDEA’s private enforcement
scheme,117 this Article theorizes that the problem lies with the statute itself
and the limits courts have read into it which, in turn, weaken the law’s ability
to beget meaningful programmatic change.

II. The IDEA’s Weaknesses Exposed
The IDEA is often praised for its robust private enforcement scheme,
but when analyzing the statute’s ability to bring about meaningful change for
students in high-poverty schools, these seemingly robust rights prove
hollow. Both in the context of individuals and groups, the IDEA is rarely
leveraged to produce meaningful remedies for students attending highpoverty schools. 118 Individual students in under-resourced and failing
schools are unable to leverage the IDEA’s core rights meant to guarantee
meaningful process, substantive educational programs, and integrated
learning environments. Each of these principles assumes a functioning
educational system and are unable to remedy a broken one. Further, students
are often blocked when they band together to access class-based
programmatic relief in two ways. First, courts’ misuse of the IDEA’s
exhaustion clause prevents systemic claims from moving forward. Second,
advocates too often focus class-based litigation on procedural fixes and
assume that guaranteeing meaningful process will translate to substantive
quality—a false equivalency.

116.
See infra Part II.A.
117.
See supra note 19.
118.
Hyman et al., supra note 19, at 114 (“[R]elative to the number of due process
filings, there is little IDEA litigation in federal courts . . . .”).
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A. The Ineffectiveness of Individual Remedies
The IDEA’s core components—procedural rights, FAPE, and LRE—
are all badly diminished when applied to resource-starved school systems.
To function as intended, all three rights require sufficiently staffed, funded,
and capable schools. The law makes assumptions about the collaborative
nature of the IEP process, reliable baseline data, and the availability of
sufficient resources to implement a variety of learning environments. But, as
illustrated in this section, none of these assumptions hold true in
high-poverty schools. Parents are often not seen as equal team members in a
collaborative process and do not have the resources to effectively challenge
schools’ conclusions about their child. Further, the inability of underfunded
schools to ensure competent teachers, professional staff, and a variety of
effective learning environments impacts students’ access to the IDEA’s core
components of FAPE and LRE. Courts, however, too often fail to scrutinize
these inequities and instead automatically defer to schools’ decisions no
matter how flawed.

1. The Futility of Procedural Rights
The IDEA’s procedural rights can be broken down into two
categories: design rights (relevant to the IEP development phase) and
demand rights (parents’ rights to invoke a variety of actions to challenge
schools’ obligations under the law).119 Design rights, related to the start of
the special education process, include parents’ right to notice and right to
meaningful participation at meetings that involve their child’s eligibility for
special education services and the resulting IEP meant to convey those
services.120 Procedural rights at this stage also specify the “who” and “what”
of IEP design—who must participate on the IEP team, what information that
team must consider, and what information must be included in an IEP. 121
Later stages include demand rights that give parents the ability to request
access to records, seek an independent evaluation of their child, or invoke a
119.
Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 446, 451 (2011) (outlining that procedural
protections at the IEP formation stage include specific directives about the individuals who
must be part of the IEP team (including parents), the types of data that must be considered
and form the basis of the IEP, and the substance of the IEP itself).
120.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 857
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding a school’s predetermination not to offer autistic student intensive
applied behavioral analysis was a procedural violation of the IDEA and because
predetermination of placement did not allow the student’s parents to meaningfully
participate in the IEP, causing substantive harm.); see also Romberg, supra note 119, at 449
(describing the goals of structural due process protections).
121.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)–(3).
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variety of procedural mechanisms to demand review of the school’s
compliance with the IDEA as it relates to their child.122 Parents can request
formal mediation, file a complaint to be investigated by the state’s
department of education, or request a due process hearing before an
independent hearing officer appointed by the state’s department of
education. 123 They can also appeal unfavorable due process decisions to
federal courts. 124 Due process complaints are the predominant choice for
dispute resolution, but are more often invoked by wealthy parents than those
with limited resources.125
Several researchers have highlighted the inequities low-income
families face when attempting to invoke demand rights.126 These include a
lack of resources to hire lawyers and experts (both of which greatly increase
the chance of success in a due process case), information asymmetries
unique to low-income families, and limitations on the usefulness of
prospective relief.127 Less scrutinized, however, is the emptiness of design
rights when applied to students in high-poverty schools.128
Design stage procedural protections are meant to ensure meaningful
parent participation and the quality of the IEP itself, but they are dependent
on a functioning and appropriately staffed educational system. Without that,
simply ensuring who must participate in the IEP drafting process and what
information must be considered, does nothing to ensure a collaborative
decision-making process or an effective IEP.129 Mandating parents’ presence
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. § 1415(a)–(b).
Id. § 1415(e)–(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.151 (“State Complaint Procedures”).
Id. § 1415(i)(2).
CTR. APPROPRIATE DISP. RESOL. SPECIAL EDUC., IDEA DISPUTE RESOLUTION DATA
SUMMARY FOR: U.S. AND OUTLYING AREAS 2008–09 TO 2018–19, at 5 (2021),
https://www.cadreworks.org/sites/default/files/resources/National%20IDEA%20Disp
ute%20Resolution%20Data%20Summary%20201920%20%20Accessible%20FINAL_1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ST56-SPWJ] (containing chart of relative use of dispute resolution
options).
126.
Pasachoff, supra note 19; Hyman et al., supra note 19.
127.
Hyman et al., supra note 19, at 121. The IDEA allows for equitable remedies
including reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses such as the cost of private tuition. It
allows a court to order placement into a private school program if the public school has
denied FAPE. The authors point out that this relief, while theoretically allowed, is rarely
practically invoked because it would require a private school to hold a place open for the
student while the student litigated the tuition payment. Id.
128.
Romberg, supra note 119, at 420 (addressing the theoretical and functional
role of due process in special education law, but without specific attention paid to lowincome students).
129.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(III). The IDEA requires that every IEP include
“a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional
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at IEP meetings cannot guarantee that schools will take time to fully
understand the complicated evaluation data about the child. Nor can it
ensure that schools will sincerely consider parents’ requests. Rather,
research demonstrates that low-income parents have limited bargaining
power throughout the IEP process. Without access to advocates, they are less
able to serve as a check on schools’ decisions.130 In fact, several schools with
large populations of non-native English speakers do not even ensure that
translation or interpretation services are routinely available to families who
need them. 131 Further, when parents attempt to invoke due process
procedures to complain about being shut out of decision-making, they rarely
win. 132 Parents who present evidence of short meeting times, 133 their
incomplete understanding of evaluation data,134 or their complete exclusion

performance,” describe “how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and
progress in the general education curriculum,” and set out “measurable annual goals,
including academic and functional goals,” along with a “description of how the child's
progress toward meeting” those goals will be gauged. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). The IEP
must also describe the “special education and related services . . . that will be provided” so
that the child may “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals” and, when
possible, “be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum.” Endrew
F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017).
130.
Pasachoff, supra note 19 (discussing information asymmetries that prevent
low-income parents from effectively participating in the IEP process); David M. Engel, Law,
Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of
Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 169 (arguing that the goal of the collaboration may have
been thwarted, at least in part, because parents are unwilling to jeopardize relationships
with their child’s school by asserting their children’s rights).
131.
T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 458 F. Supp. 3d 274, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2020); H.P. v. Bd.
of Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F. Supp. 3d 623, 637 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
132.
R.F. ex rel. E.F. v. Cecil Cnty. Pub. Sch., 919 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 156 (2019) (holding that school did not significantly impede parents’
procedural rights to participate in decision making regarding their child’s education when
their child’s placement was changed for four months without involving them). The court
determined that participation in decision making regarding R.F.’s education was not
“significantly impeded” when Cecil County Public Schools (“CCPS”) changed R.F.’s
placement without conferring with her parents. Id. at 249 (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II)). In changing R.F.’s placement, CCPS provided her more special
education services, not fewer, in the ICSC, consistent with her parents’ objection that her
IEP contained too many hours in the general education classroom. Id. at 248. Yet, the court
held that CCPS did not significantly impede R.F.’s parents’ participation rights when it
failed to inform them that it was gradually changing R.F.’s placement in line with their
expressed wishes. Id. at 249.
133.
R.F., 919 F.3d. at 242.
134.
Colonial Sch. Dist. v. G.K. ex rel. A.K., 763 F. App’x 192, 192 (3d Cir. 2019)
(finding parents of an elementary school student with autism and specific learning
disabilities could not show that a Pennsylvania district excluded them from the IEP process
by failing to ensure that they fully understood their son’s IEP goals).
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from meetings have not persuaded courts to find that schools violated their
obligations to confer FAPE.135
Requiring the right people to be present at the meeting and
specifying the type of data to be considered does not ensure sufficient quality
of the people or the data. High-poverty schools struggle to attract and retain
qualified teachers.136 When teachers lack training and experience it is less
likely they are delivering effective instruction. 137 For the vast majority of
students with disabilities, most of their learning takes place in the regular
education classrooms.138 Data that the IEP team considers when assessing a
child’s current academic performance and when making predictions about
their potential relies in large part on the quality of instruction delivered in
that setting. 139 When instruction in regular education is ineffective, the
picture about a child’s current performance and future potential is tainted.
In short, a child’s lack of progress may be a reflection of poor educational
instruction rather than the impact of a disability, but school-based members
of the IEP team are not likely to admit or even consider such a perspective.
Further, the limited resources of high-poverty schools result in fewer
professional staff, like school psychologists. As a result, higher caseloads
decrease the likelihood of providing quality assessments and evaluations
from which to base decisions.140
135.
D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
school district did not violate the IDEA when it ignored parents’ letters for months but
included the parents in their child’s IEP meeting because they eventually could participate
in their child’s IEP).
136 .
Special Education Teacher Shortage, supra note 105 (“While the special
education teacher shortage affects schools across the spectrum, it tends to impact highpoverty schools most acutely.”).
137.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30; see also Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher
Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES 1 (Jan. 1, 2000) (finding that policy investments in the quality of teachers may be
related to improvements in student performance).
138 .
Students with Disabilities in Condition of Education, supra note 73, at 4
(“Ninety-five percent of students ages 6–21 served under IDEA in fall 2019 were enrolled
in regular schools . . . the percentage who spent most of the school day . . . in general
classes in regular schools increased from 59 percent in fall 2009 to 65 percent in fall
2019.”).
139 .
LINDA P. BLANTON ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, PREPARING
GENERAL EDUCATION TEACHERS TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 16
(2011), https://www.ncld.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/aacte_ncld_recommenda
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMC6-5695].
140.
NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHS., SHORTAGES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY: CHALLENGES TO
MEETING THE GROWING NEEDS OF U.S. STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS 1 (2021) (recommending “a
ratio of no more than 500 students per school psychologist when more comprehensive and
preventive services are being provided . . . . The ratio of students per school psychologist
was estimated to be 1,211 to 1 in the United States in the 2019–2020 school year”).
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Consequently, for most parents, design stage procedural protections
only guarantee certain people will be present at an IEP meeting. They do not
ensure unbiased or objective views on any of the data presented. Parents,
without some level of independent expertise about educational assessments,
are unable to effectively challenge schools’ decisions about their child’s
performance, projected progress, the effectiveness of educational
instruction, or recommendations about the specialized instruction needed.
Meaningful leverage at the design stage would require the ability to challenge
the school’s conclusions with an expert who could argue that their child was
capable of more or needed something different than what the school
proposes. However, because few low-income parents have the resources to
hire outside experts, they often must wait until the IEP is implemented and
their child fails to have the evidence needed to challenge the school’s
program. 141
Critics may argue that parents can still challenge an ineffective IEP
by demonstrating a child’s inability to meet the goals contained therein.
While true, there are at least two problems with this remedy. First, it puts
parents in the position of having to wait for their child to fail before gaining
enough leverage to compel change in their child’s services. 142 Second,
because of the Supreme Court’s exaltation of procedure, many lower courts
defer to schools’ decision-making regarding substance when schools
demonstrate their adherence to process. Stated differently, courts fail to
adequately scrutinize the substantive educational program. This second
point is explored in the following section by analyzing how the IDEA’s
substantive promise of FAPE is significantly diminished for students with
disabilities in high-poverty schools.

2. A Diminished Right to FAPE
Students with disabilities’ right to a substantively adequate
educational program is encased in the IDEA’s concept of FAPE. The Supreme
Court first had occasion to scrutinize the FAPE standard in its seminal case,
Board of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley. 143 There, the Court contrasted the
IDEA’s “elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards” with its
“general and somewhat imprecise” substantive requirement concluding that,
“the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be
141.
Hyman et al., supra note 19, at 113 (describing the shortage of special
education lawyers).
142.
Pasachoff, supra note 19, at 1436 (describing how informational asymmetries
and a lack of lawyers lead to less bargaining power for low-income parents).
143.
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
180–85 (1982).
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gainsaid.”144 With this framing in mind, the Supreme Court instructed lower
courts to apply a two-part test when reviewing the sufficiency of an IEP
asking: First, has the school complied with the procedures of the IDEA?
Second, was the IEP reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits?145
Ultimately, the Court emphasized procedure and concluded that “adequate
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in
an IEP.” 146 In short, Rowley stood for the proposition that scrupulous
attention to procedures would help guarantee the IDEA’s more opaque
promise to confer a substantively appropriate education.
Then, in 2004 Congress amended the IDEA to both clarify and limit
when procedural violations could rise to the level of remediable harms.147 It
instructed hearing officers to base their determinations on substantive
rather than procedural grounds, unless the procedural violation resulted in
a denial of FAPE.148 Lower courts began diminishing the effects of procedural
violations, holding that even where a school had violated a procedural right,
parents were not entitled to remedies unless they could link that violation to
substantive harm.149
More than thirty years after Rowley, the Supreme Court revisited the
FAPE standard in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, focusing on the
second part of the test and looking at the substantive requirement of FAPE.150
The Court held that schools meet their obligation to confer FAPE when they
reasonably calculate an IEP to “enable a child to make progress appropriate
in light of the child’s circumstances.” 151 For a child fully integrated in the
regular classroom, an appropriate IEP should enable them to “achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” 152 When a child is not
capable of grade level achievement, the IEP must be “appropriately
ambitious in light of [their] circumstances.” 153 Notably, Endrew F. did not
144.
Id. at 205.
145.
Id. at 206–07.
146.
Id. at 205–06.
147.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).
148.
Id.
149.
See, e.g., Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Because the District’s procedural violation did not amount to a
substantive deprivation . . . there was no violation of [the student’s] right to an appropriate
education. In the absence of a violation of his right to an appropriate education, [he] is not
entitled to compensatory education.”).
150.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017).
151.
Id. at 998–99.
152.
Id. at 999–1000 (citation omitted).
153.
Id. at 1000.
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overrule Rowley and thus, the Court’s steadfast faith in the value of the IDEA’s
procedural protections remains.154
For students in broken school systems, the foundational principle of
FAPE is compromised in three ways. First, courts fail to recognize the futility
of process (as described above) and continue to adhere to precedent which
commands uncompromising deference to schools’ decision-making. Stated
differently, some courts continue to place more value on the first part of the
Rowley standard—whether the IEP was reasonably calculated. When schools
can demonstrate compliance with process, courts fail to adequately
scrutinize the second question—whether the IEP delivered substantively
appropriate education.155 Second, the metric used to measure “appropriate”
education, grade level performance, is itself flawed because high-poverty
schools struggle to ensure basic grade level competency overall. Thus, courts
turn to Endrew F.’s more amorphous instruction to look for “appropriately
ambitious” goals. 156 Once an objective standard is lost, students with
disabilities struggle to convince courts that they are capable of something
more than what a school has ordained as “appropriate.” Third, courts
consistently find that instructional programs are entirely within the control
of schools. Consequently, there is little parents can do to improve the quality
of instruction in a high-poverty school, even when that instruction is clearly
inadequate.

a. Courts’ Misplaced Reliance on Process
The Supreme Court’s exaltation of process has caused many lower
courts to narrow their inquiry when reviewing FAPE challenges.157 Several
circuits refuse to examine educational outcomes after an IEP is in place,
instead indicating that the only relevant evidence is the information that was
before the IEP team at the time it developed the IEP.158 Stated differently, in
certain circuits, evidence relating to whether the child succeeded or failed
154.
Distinguishing Rowley on the basis that it “had no need to provide concrete
guidance with respect to a child who is not fully integrated in the regular classroom and
not able to achieve on grade level.” Id.
155.
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206–07 (1982).
156.
Id.
157.
See, e.g., L.H. v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 900 F.3d 779, 790–91 (6th Cir.
2018) (“If the procedural requirements are satisfied, the court grants greater deference to
the State ALJ’s determinations on the second step, the substantive analysis.”).
158.
Dennis Fan, Note, No Idea What the Future Holds: The Retrospective Evidence
Dilemma, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1505 (2014) (“Courts in many jurisdictions refuse to
consider evidence of any later educational benefit the student actually received when
determining whether the school district provided a FAPE via the IEP.”).
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under the IEP is irrelevant to determining the sufficiency of an IEP. Courts
that restrict evidence to the time the IEP was written reason that actual
progress or regression following the IEP is not “legally relevant” to the
question of whether an IEP “was calculated to confer some educational
benefit.” 159 Thus, for parents in these particular circuits, challenging the
effectiveness of an IEP without access to experts who can challenge school
psychologists’ conclusions about their child’s potential is an all but
impossible task. Further, because courts only look to whether the IEP was
“reasonable” and not ideal, schools are often unaccountable for poor
decisions made at the design stage.160
The problem with fixating on process as a measure of adequacy
becomes even more evident when the substantive program itself is deficient.
An IEP can be both procedurally adequate and reasonably calculated, but
entirely ineffective. For instance, if a school lacks quality teachers or simply
does not have access to the training or other specialized supports children
with disabilities require, a perfectly written IEP is meaningless because it
cannot be successfully implemented. A well-written IEP will not address the
fact that untrained or poorly trained teachers will be limited in their ability
to effectively advance the knowledge of their pupils. Likewise, chaotic and
understaffed classrooms and ineffective methodology will inhibit learning.
All of these represent programmatic challenges that contribute to a denial of
FAPE but have nothing to do with whether or not an IEP was reasonably
designed according to procedure.
Even where parents have resources to secure experts, they struggle
to overcome courts’ deference to schools’ judgements. Essentially, plaintiffs
must prove that a child’s failure to meet annual academic goals is the fault of
the school’s instructional program and not due to the child or their disability.
For example, in a case before the Third Circuit, parents of a child with ADHD
and undiagnosed dyslexia alleged the school district denied FAPE when their
daughter demonstrated minimal reading progress after four years of special

159.
Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P. ex rel. Bess P., 62 F.3d 520, 534 (3d Cir. 1995) (“In
any event, appropriateness is judged prospectively so that any lack of progress under a
particular IEP, assuming arguendo that there was no progress, does not render that IEP
inappropriate.”); see also Fuhrmann ex rel. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d
1031, 1039–40 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Rowley requires, at the time the initial evaluation is
undertaken, an IEP need only be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.’”).
160.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017). “The ‘reasonably calculated’ qualification reflects a recognition that crafting an
appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by school
officials . . . any review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is
reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Id. at 991–92.
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education services. 161 This case involved parents who, over a three-year
period, consistently advocated with the school in an effort to obtain better
outcomes for their daughter before invoking due process rights.162 The Third
Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on behalf of the school, finding no
denial of FAPE despite the child’s admittedly slow progress. 163 The court
sided with the school in large part because of evidence indicating frequent
meetings with the parents and updates to the IEP. The parents’ expert, a
neuropsychologist, testified that their child’s poor achievement
demonstrated that she was not benefiting from the school’s instruction and
evidenced the school’s “global disregard for this level of impairment.” 164
However, the court declined to credit this testimony, and instead deferred to
the school, stating “we may not rely on hindsight to second-guess an
educational program that was reasonable at the time.”165
Setting aside the question of whether the evidence actually
demonstrated that the school’s program was adequate, what is striking here
is the court’s dogged determination to credit the school for its continued
willingness to engage with the parents, and the court’s unwillingness to
question the root of the parents’ concerns—the quality of the school’s
educational program. Whether the school meets its obligation to confer FAPE
turns on what is reasonable progress for this particular child given the effects
of her disability (here dyslexia and ADHD).166 The parents found at least one
expert who determined that their daughter was capable of making more
progress—of learning to read past a first grade level with the right
instruction and support.167 But one expert was not enough to overcome the
deference afforded to schools who met the procedural requirements of the
IDEA—even where it was the parents and not the school who were pushing
for improvements to their child’s IEP, as was the case here.168 This distinction
matters because the obligation to confer FAPE rests with the school, not with
parents. Thus, it was arguably parent pressure, not the FAPE obligation, that

161.
K.D. ex rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir.
2018) (noting that when entering her third-grade year, the student was reading on a
first-grade level).
162.
Id. at 252.
163 .
Id. at 253 (“He found that Downingtown remained aware of K.D.'s slow
progress and kept trying to improve her programming in response to K.D.'s performance
and Dr. Kelly’s report . . . Downingtown ‘did not simply hand out the same IEP year after
year,’ but repeated foundational skills where needed . . . .”).
164.
Id. at 252.
165.
Id. at 255.
166.
Id. at 251.
167.
Id. at 252.
168.
Id. at 252–53.
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caused the school to revise the IEP.169 But the Third Circuit did not review
the case with that in mind. This is not to suggest that schools can never be
held accountable for their failures to ensure progress, but it does illustrate
the steep hill parents must climb to overcome the deference afforded to
schools who meet procedural requirements of the IDEA.170
This general problem is even worse for students in high-poverty
schools. Where a school can demonstrate that they are meeting procedural
requirements of the IDEA, courts will all too quickly lay the blame for slow
progress on children themselves, rather than attribute it to the instructional
program.171 Even when schools have terrible instructional programs, it can
be difficult for students to attribute these failings to the school rather than
their disability, particularly without the aid of an expert and where courts
are unwilling to scrutinize the outcomes of an IEP. 172 As long as schools
continue to offer special education services, engage in timely reviews and
updates of a child’s IEP, and can demonstrate the child made some sort of
progress, a reviewing court will likely find that they have met the IDEA’s
FAPE requirement. Thus, for the students whose families do not have the
resources to hire experts, or front the cost of private tuition and sue for
reimbursement, the IDEA holds little promise to remedy failing educational
programs.
Even when courts move past procedural deference to examine
whether a program was substantively sufficient to confer FAPE, students in
high-poverty schools are at a disadvantage. As discussed below, the FAPE
standard itself depends on a healthy educational program, and without it, the
standard is fatally flawed.

169.
Id. at 256 (“After K.D.’s parents notified Downingtown of Dr. Kelly’s evaluation
and recommendations, Downingtown responded within a week. It scheduled a meeting,
sought more assessments, and offered a one-on-one aide. And it developed a fourth IEP,
which incorporated many of Dr. Kelly’s recommendations, including adopting a new
reading program.”).
170.
See, e.g., D.C. v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 20-20339, 2021 WL 2492842, at *3
(5th Cir. June 17, 2021) (upholding a hearing officer’s decision ordering the school district
to modify their reading instruction program and provide compensatory education).
171.
Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Schs., 906 F.3d 182, 195–96 (1st Cir. 2018) (“To the extent
that Johnson implies that ‘slow’ progress is, in and of itself, insufficient to constitute a
‘meaningful educational benefit,’ we cannot agree. Instead, the relationship between speed
of advancement and the educational benefit must be viewed in light of a child’s individual
circumstances.”).
172.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d
1175, 1179 (D. Colo. 2018) (“[A]t the end of his fourth grade year, Petitioner’s
parents . . . enroll[ed] Petitioner at . . . a private school that specializes in the education of
children with autism. It is undisputed that Petitioner has been able to access education
[there] where he is making academic, social and behavioral progress.”).
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b. The Limits of FAPE’s Substantive Standard
In Endrew F., the Supreme Court confirmed that FAPE was meant to
provide a substantive standard of education to students with disabilities.173
The Court declined to create a bright-line rule, and instead tied the standard
to an individual student’s capacity. When a child is capable of learning on
grade level and fully integrated into the regular classroom, the Court
concluded said that a legally sufficient IEP would enable the child to progress
through the regular curriculum.174 When a child is not capable of grade level
progress, their goals must be “appropriately ambitious” in light of their
individual circumstances.175 But, in some high-poverty schools, virtually no
children are meeting grade level standards. 176 Thus, in these schools the
more amorphous guideline requiring “appropriately ambitious goals” takes
hold and opens the door to lower academic standards.
The DOE’s guidance instructs schools to ensure IEPs have annual
goals that are “sufficiently ambitious to help close the gap” between the
child’s current progress and grade level achievements.177 Yet, in some public
high schools, less than half of students are passing state standardized reading
and math tests.178 Essentially, the FAPE standard assumes high-functioning,
173.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 995
(2017) (“[T]he Court nonetheless made clear that the Act guarantees a substantively
adequate program of education to all eligible children.”).
174.
Id. at 999 (citing Rowley, 485 U.S. at 203–04 (“[R]easonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade”)).
175.
Id. at 1000.
176.
The Conditions of Education: Reading Performance, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.
(2019),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cnb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
A4DX-XQUW] (reporting that the average reading score for 8th-grade students in highpoverty schools was lower than the scores for 8th grade students in low- and mid-low
poverty schools); see also Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 7–8, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 16-CV13292, 2016 WL 4775474 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016) (identifying that the plaintiffs,
Detroit schoolchildren, regularly show little to no proficiency across all subject areas).
177.
Dear Colleague Letter: FAPE Guidance, Director Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative
Services
1,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.
(Nov.
16,
2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/guidance-on-fape-11-172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMQ8-DPQ4] (clarifying that in order to ensure that children
with disabilities have meaningful access to a State’s academic content standards and are
held to high expectations, an IEP must align with the state’s academic standard depending
on the child’s grade).
178.
SC School Report Card, Allendale County Schools, 2020-2021,
https://screportcards.ed.sc.gov/overview/?q=eT0yMDIxJnQ9RCZzaWQ9MDMwMTAwN
A [https://perma.cc/Q3J8-PFFZ] (reporting a 29.9% pass rate for English One end of year
course assessment and 17.2% pass rate on Algebra One end of year course assessment);
see also Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 6, 91–92, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 16-CV-13292, 2016 WL
4775474 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016) (finding that among certain high-poverty Detroit
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well-funded schools, where inclusion is offered and most regular education
students are meeting grade level standards. In that setting, a student with a
disability struggling to keep up with grade level achievement may be able to
hold a school accountable for more, different, or better special education
services.179 But, in high-poverty schools with diminished levels of grade level
achievement, students with disabilities are unable to leverage grade level
standards for improved outcomes. In short, rather than raising the bar, the
FAPE standard aligns with a lowered standard reflecting the depressed level
of achievement in these schools.
When a child is not learning at grade level or not fully integrated into
the regular classroom, determining the appropriate academic achievement
becomes more muddled. 180 In this scenario, a school meets its FAPE
obligation when it designs an IEP that is “appropriately ambitious” in light of
the child’s circumstances. 181 Yet, determining what is “appropriately
ambitious” for a child is subjective. While schools should certainly rely on
data gathered from the child’s performance on tests, teacher observations,
and other cognitive and achievement testing, there are limits to what that
data can accurately reveal. 182 And when a child is trapped in a
low-functioning school system, none of that data can accurately show
whether a child’s poor performance is due solely to their disability or rather
to a low-quality instructional program. 183 In short, when schools can
demonstrate procedural compliance, a child’s poor performance is more
likely to be attributed to their internal failings (disability and lack of
motivation) rather than external factors (unqualified teachers and
ineffective instruction). Moreover, as described below, if parents attempt to
challenge the instructional program itself, their efforts are largely stymied by
courts’ ferocious deference to schools’ judgements regarding educational
methodology.

school districts, “only 4.2% of third grade students scored proficient or above on the State
of Michigan’s 2015-2016 English assessment test”).
179.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30.
180.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 992.
181.
Id.
182.
Ryan, supra note 101, at 1484; see also Torin D. Togut & Jennifer E. Nix, The
Helter Skelter World of IDEA Eligibility for Specific Learning Disability: The Clash of
Response-to-Intervention and Child Find Requirements, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
568, 572 (2012) (critiquing the severe discrepancy model for identifying learning
disabilities for producing inconsistencies across states and suggesting a different model is
necessary to introduce more stability and consistency).
183.
Ryan, supra note 101, at 1484.
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c. Schools’ Supremacy over Instructional
Programs
The final reason why students in high-poverty schools are unable to
ensure substantively appropriate education is rooted in courts’ unyielding
deference to schools’ decisions about educational instruction. An individual
student’s access to FAPE often rests in large part on the effectiveness of a
school’s chosen methodology, yet the individual student has little ability to
demand that a certain program or approach be a part of the school’s
academic offerings. Courts are exceedingly deferential to schools as experts
in determining matters of educational policy.184 Thus, parents’ preference for
a specific methodology does not obligate a school district to employ it. 185
Moreover, schools are not required to choose programs that maximize a
child’s chance of success or even guarantee progress.186 Practically speaking,
parents are at the mercy of a school’s chosen educational program and have
little leverage within the IDEA to demand something different, even when
experience demonstrates that certain methods work well for their child.187
At best, once a child has failed under the school’s chosen program, parents
may be able to leverage the IDEA to get compensatory education or tuition

184.
The absence of a bright-line rule “should not be mistaken for an invitation to
the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which they review. At the same time, deference is based on the
application of expertise and the exercise of judgment by school authorities. Endrew F., 137
S. Ct. at 1001.
185.
A.S. ex rel. S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. App’x 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2014) (ruling
that while the parents preferred for their child to attend an ABA-based program, the
student could also receive an educational benefit from the district’s use of the TEACCH
methodology); Carlson v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR 213 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that a parent’s disagreement with the district’s educational methodology was insufficient
to establish an IDEA violation); Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988) (holding that parents do not have a right to
compel a school district to provide a specific program or employ a specific methodology in
providing for the education of a student with a disability); Matthews v. Douglas Cnty. Sch.
Dist. RE 1, 73 IDELR 42 (D. Colo. 2018) (holding that a district did not violate the IDEA
when it used the Wilson Reading System to provide instruction to a high schooler with
dyslexia and other disabilities since some educational methodologies share the same core
instructional approach).
186.
Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR 210 (Minn. SEA 2009) (finding that
neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations require an IEP to include a specific
methodology or one that would maximize the student’s abilities).
187.
M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th
Cir. 2006) (ruling that although the parents argued that auditory-verbal therapy was the
best methodology for the student, the district is only required to provide an appropriate
methodology).
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reimbursement should they leave the public school setting for a private
setting with more effective instruction.188
A brief hypothetical helps illustrate the programmatic constraints
parents bump up against with methodology. “Specific Learning Disability” is
by far the largest category within the IDEA, representing about 30% (almost
2.2 million) of students who receive services under the law.189 Children with
certain learning disabilities, including dyslexia, may struggle to grasp
foundational building blocks of matching sounds to letters, known as
phonemic awareness—an essential step in learning how to read.190 A child
with an identified deficit in this area will need specialized instruction to help
them acquire basic reading skills and there is no shortage of reading
programs to choose from. 191 The Orton Gillingham (“OG”) method, a
multi-sensory approach to teaching reading and spelling, is a well-known
and highly effective program for students with dyslexia, in part because of its
focus on phonemic awareness.192 Yet, even where a parent has evidence that
OG has worked for their child, a school district is under no obligation to
implement it, or even find something similar. Rather, the school district can
choose to implement whatever reading program or specialized instruction
they prefer.
Critics may argue that schools should absolutely have the right to
determine educational instruction and that giving parents the ability to
demand different methodology is costly, unworkable, and inefficient. As a
starting premise, the choice of instructional program, training provided to
teachers, and delivery of that instruction are decisions rightfully left up to
school officials. But that deference should not be a license to violate the
IDEA’s FAPE requirement. Yet, when courts afford schools unwavering
188.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247
(2009) (“IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services
when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is
appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education or
related services through the public school.”); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas
Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1179 (D. Colo. 2018) (“In May of
2010 . . . Petitioner’s parents decided to withdraw him from Summit View and enroll
Petitioner at the Firefly Autism House, a private school that specializes in the education of
children with autism [where Petitioner] is making academic, social and behavioral
progress.”).
189.
Students with Disabilities, supra note 73.
190.
What Is Dyslexia?, UNDERSTOOD.ORG, https://www.understood.org/articles/
en/whatisdyslexia?_sp=b08b2a4316a140f08976ad40364e56a0.1627989366681#Snaps
hot:_What_dyslexia_is [https://perma.cc/SUY2-5CA3].
191.
Id.
192.
NAT’L READING PANEL, TEACHING CHILDREN TO READ: AN EVIDENCE-BASED
ASSESSMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LITERATURE ON READING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
READING INSTRUCTION 2–119, app. F (2000).
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deference in their choice of methodology, they do just that. Parents are left
to fight for individualized fixes in an overall methodology that is not well
suited to deliver FAPE for their child.
Returning to the hypothetical, to secure OG services, parents would
either need to convince the school-based members of the IEP team that the
OG method was necessary at the design stage of their child’s IEP, or if that
failed, invoke due process. In either scenario, parents likely need to enlist an
expert willing to attest to the need for OG to counter the school’s perceived
expertise.193 Further, should parents attempt to invoke due process, courts’
unwillingness to engage in “Monday morning quarterbacking” of schools’ IEP
design leaves parents with little ammunition to challenge a school’s chosen
methodology.194 Accordingly, parents’ only recourse is to wait for the child
to fail under the school’s methodology and then allege a denial of FAPE. Even
in this latter scenario, the likely remedy is reimbursement for an
individualized OG tutoring program rather than implementation of OG for
the entire school system.195
By force of circumstance, children who attend underfunded and
under-resourced schools are likely to encounter low-quality instructional
programs and the IDEA offers little hope to remedy their fate. By placing
methodology entirely within a school’s control, parents are unable to
leverage the IDEA’s FAPE requirement to advocate for better instructional
programs, even when the school’s existing program has failed.

3. Shortcomings of LRE
While the LRE mandate clearly directs schools to preference
education in the regular education setting, it also allows for a continuum of
alternative placements in anticipation of the fact that this setting will not be
appropriate for all children.196 School districts, and sometimes states, control
these points along the continuum, and the IDEA allows for consolidation of

193.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001
(2017) (“This absence of a bright-line rule, however, should not be mistaken for an
invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for
those of the school authorities which they review.”) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
194.
Fuhrmann ex rel. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040
(3d Cir. 1993) (“Neither the statute nor reason countenance ‘Monday Morning
Quarterbacking’ in evaluating the appropriateness of a child’s placement.”).
195.
See infra Part II.B.1.
196.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.115.
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services.197 It should come as no surprise that schools with limited resources
have diminished ability to design and implement a variety of options on the
continuum. 198 Schools with limited resources instead look for efficiencies,
which often leads to centralizing programs. Thus, students attending highpoverty schools have fewer options along the continuum for quality
placements and are more likely to wind up in segregated programs.199 Once
in these segregated settings, students have little ability to leverage the IDEA
to get themselves out of ill-suited programs.
An example of the LRE trap is Georgia’s statewide system of
segregated specialized schools, known as the Georgia Network for Education
and Therapeutic Support (“GNETS”) Program.200 The program was originally
limited to students in the IDEA category of Emotional Disturbance, but it has
since been extended to include any student with a disability unable to
succeed in the traditional classroom because of their behavior. 201 Despite
founded accusations of mismanagement, poor educational outcomes, and

197.
Osborne, supra note 87, at 1012 (“In the overwhelming majority of lawsuits in
which a parent contests a placement in a school other than the neighborhood school, the
courts have found that the student’s IEP required the centralized placement.”); see also
Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1991)
(upholding the placement of a hearing-impaired high school student at a centralized
program, even though the placement was not at his neighborhood school).
198.
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS, supra note 32, at 35–36.
199.
Schifter, supra note 7, at 4 (finding that low-income students with disabilities
were more likely to be placed in substantially separate classrooms than their non-lowincome peers).
200.
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 160-4-7-.15; Letter from Vanita Gupta, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, C.R. Div., to The Honorable Nathan Deal, Governor (July 15, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ
Findings Letter], https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_lof.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E5TY-LGML] (“Today, the GNETS Program consists of a network of 24 regions
operated by the State, which serve approximately 5,000 students at any given time, all of
whom have behavior-related disabilities.”).
201 .
GNETS includes “students [with disabilities] who exhibit intense social,
emotional and/or behavioral challenges with a severity, frequency or duration such that
the provision of education and related services in the general education environment has
not enabled him or her to benefit educationally based on the IEP. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1604-7-15(2)(a); see also Rachel Aviv, Georgia’s Separate and Unequal Education System, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/
georgias-separate-and-unequal-special-education-system
[https://perma.cc/DCB3YCM4] (“GNETS was created as a single educational center . . . to provide therapeutic and
educational support for students with emotional or behavioral health needs . . . Georgia
expanded the program to create a network of “psycho-educational centers” throughout the
state.”).
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even abuse, the program continues to exist and serve as a placement for
children with emotional or behavioral challenges.202
By consolidating behavioral health supports into specialized
schools, Georgia has created a program that is easy to enter and difficult to
leave. Teachers refer children to the GNETS program if they determine a
student’s behavioral needs cannot be met in the regular school setting.203 Of
course, one reason the child’s needs cannot be addressed in the regular
education setting is because Georgia consolidated behavioral supports into
the GNETS program. Thus, the child is not receiving supportive services that
would allow them to be successful in a regular education classroom.204 Once
an individual child becomes part of the GNETS, they must meet exit criteria
based on the behaviors that necessitated their placement to leave the
program. 205 A DOJ investigation found “not only that the exit criteria
developed for most students were vague or boilerplate, but also that exit
criteria often contained higher standards of behavior than would be
expected of students in general education schools, effectively rendering
students with behavior-related disabilities ‘stuck’ in segregated GNETS
programs.”206
As is true for many segregated settings for students with disabilities,
GNETS’s academic programming is woefully inadequate. A 2015 DOJ
investigation found that students generally do not receive grade level
instruction and, in fact, that in some facilities, students are exclusively taught
by computer based credit-recovery programs. 207 Further, many GNETS
202.
Timothy Pratt, The Separate, Unequal Education of Students with Special Needs:
Georgia’s System to Teach Children with Disabilities Falls Vastly Short of Its Promise, THE
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
21,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2017/03/the-separate-unequal-education-of-students-with-special-needs/520140/
[https://perma.cc/XN7Q-EAL9].
203.
DOJ Findings Letter, supra note 200 (“A number of parents reported, and our
review of records indicated, that their children were often immediately referred to the
GNETS Program after one incident or several interrelated incidents associated with a
single event or problem, such as using inappropriate language with a teacher on more than
one occasion.”).
204.
Id. (“The State’s support and development of GNETS has effectively created
one placement option for many students with behavior-related disabilities to the exclusion
of all others. This structure limits the State-funded resources available to meet the needs
of children with disabilities for mental health and behavior-related educational services.”).
205.
Id. at 10.
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 17 (“According to our experts, many of the computer-based instructional
programs used in GNETS programs are ‘credit recovery programs,’ designed to . . . allow[]
students to make up course credits after missing classes . . . . We visited two GNETS Centers
where the students received all . . . academic instruction by computer using credit
recovery programs.”).
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students are denied access to electives and extracurricular activities and
attend school in inferior facilities lacking core features of other schools, such
as gymnasiums, cafeterias, libraries, science labs, and playgrounds.208 And
yet, the IDEA has not been successfully leveraged to close it down.
GNETS’ flaws did not go unnoticed or unchallenged by parents,209
disability rights activists, and even the federal government.210 But the legal
tool used to challenge the program was not the IDEA, but rather the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and its companion, Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”). 211 The choice to forgo the
IDEA’s remedies illustrates the shortcomings of the IDEA’s ability to remedy
programmatic concerns. The very existence of a statewide program like
GNETS that not only segregates students with disabilities, but also relegates
them to inferior educational opportunities, illustrates the IDEA’s
ineffectiveness at remedying programmatic concerns. The IDEA does not
sanction unnecessary segregation, nor does it allow for unequal educational
opportunities, yet the law could not be leveraged to put an end to such
practices.
Because the IDEA’s rights are built almost entirely around the
individual student, it is difficult to expand on these remedies for broader
change. Moreover, the IDEA incentivizes individual and incremental
remedies, which can be meaningless in a largely broken educational system.
As described in the following section, there are several obstacles to engaging
208.
Id. at 3 (“Students in the GNETS Program also often lack access to electives
and extracurricular[s] . . . . Moreover, many . . . [use] inferior facilities . . . lack[ing] many of
the features and amenities of general education schools . . . . Some GNETS Centers are . . . in
poor-quality buildings that . . . served as schools for black students during de jure
segregation . . . .”).
209.
In 2017, parents of children with disabilities in—or at risk of entering—
GNETS filed a class action lawsuit against the State of Georgia claiming discrimination
under Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. On March 19, 2020, the district court denied Georgia’s motion to dismiss,
allowing the case to proceed to discovery. Ga. Advoc. Off. v. Georgia, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1311,
1315 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
210.
In July 2015, DOJ found GNETS violates Title II of the ADA by (1) unnecessarily
segregating students with disabilities and (2) failing to offer grade level instruction that
meets state education standards. DOJ Findings Letter, supra note 200, at 2. Despite the
shocking conclusions in DOJ’s letter of finding, Georgia continued to defend the GNETS
program and refused to enter into settlement talks with DOJ or make significant changes
to the program. As a result, in 2016, DOJ filed a lawsuit against the State, alleging that the
State’s administration of the GNETS system violates the ADA by “unnecessarily segregating
students with disabilities from their peers” and providing “unequal” education
opportunity to GNETS students. Complaint ¶ 62, United States v. Georgia, 461 F. Supp. 3d
1315 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
211.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
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systemic relief, and both courts and advocates can be obstacles to effective
programmatic remedies.

B. Thwarted Systemic Remedies
When students with disabilities in high-poverty schools attempt to
achieve programmatic, rather than individual remedies, they encounter two
obstacles. First, systemic claims are thwarted by courts’ heavy-handed use of
the IDEA’s exhaustion clause. Second, advocates too often target systemic
claims at procedural issues, leaving the substance up to chance. The
following Section explores courts’ application of the exhaustion clause,
concluding that systemic claims are unjustly dismissed. It then offers an
original analysis of certified and putative class actions in federal courts
during the last fifteen years, revealing an almost singular focus on issues of
process in IDEA class actions.212 While such claims are of value, they do not
strike at the heart of the problem for students in high-poverty schools—
improving the educational program itself.

1. Courts’ Rigid Application of the Exhaustion
Requirement
Congress clearly intended to confer IDEA-eligible students and their
parents the right to hold schools accountable for their obligations under the
law.213 The statute includes an exhaustion requirement compelling plaintiffs
“seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA]” to first exhaust the
IDEA’s administrative procedures prior to invoking other federal laws
protecting the rights of students with disabilities.214 By 2017, the exhaustion
requirement had caused enough confusion in federal courts that the
Supreme Court sought to clarify it. 215 Unfortunately, it did not reach any
conclusions on the scope or validity of exceptions to exhaustion,216 and lower
courts’ subsequent varied—and arguably narrow—interpretations of those
exceptions too often restrict plaintiffs from bringing systemic claims to
remedy programmatic deficiencies.
The purpose of exhaustion has been described as placing “those with
specialized knowledge—education professionals—at the center of the

212.
See infra Part II.B.2.
213.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
214.
Id.
215.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (“We granted certiorari
to address confusion in the courts of appeals as to the scope of § 1415(l)’s exhaustion
requirement.”).
216.
Id.
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decision-making process” before allowing complainants to seek recourse
through fora whose members possess less expertise. 217 Courts have long
been leery of substituting their judgement in place of that of educators.218 By
requiring parents to first exhaust claims before an administrative body,
courts ensure “agencies, not the courts . . . have primary responsibility for
the programs that Congress has charged them to administer” 219 and that
exhaustion allows the agency to “compile a record which is adequate for
judicial review.” 220 Requiring exhaustion also advances Congress’s view,
“that the needs of [children with disabilities] are best accommodated by
having the parents and the local education agency work together to
formulate an individualized plan for each . . . child’s education.” 221 Lower
courts all agree that certain exceptions are warranted, but circuits vary on
the categories and scope of exceptions.
From the IDEA’s inception, however, Congress recognized
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ),
the author and floor manager of the Senate bill, stated that “exhaustion of the
administrative procedures established under this part should not be
required for any individual complainant filing a judicial action in cases where
such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter.”222 In the
decades since, courts have recognized several exceptions, which broadly fit
into three categories: futility, issues of a purely legal nature, 223 and

217.
Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2002).
218.
See, e.g., E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley, 135 F.3d
566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court must . . . resist[] any impulse to ‘substitute
[its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.’”) (last
alteration in original) (quoting Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206 (1982)).
219 .
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)).
220.
Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 487
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)).
221.
Rosemary Queenan, Delay & Irreparable Harm: A Study of Exhaustion Through
the Lens of the IDEA, 99 N.C.L. REV. 985, 1005 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
992, 1012 (1984)) (discussing additional goals of exhaustion including giving
administrative agencies the chance to correct their own errors).
222.
121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statements of Sen. Harrison A. Williams).
223.
See McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868,
875 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044
(10th Cir. 1993) for an exception to exhaustion when “a plaintiff’s challenge to a policy of
general applicability ‘raise[s] only questions of law, thereby rendering agency expertise
and the factual development of an administrative record less important’”); Lester H. ex rel.
Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869–70 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying the exception where
the factual record was fully developed and parties agreed that the school had failed (or
chosen not) to implement plaintiff’s requested relief).
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emergency situations where exhaustion would cause “severe or irreparable
harm.”224
Class action suits invoking the IDEA are often thwarted by the
exhaustion clause when courts refuse to permit applicable exceptions,
specifically, the futility exception. The futility exception applies when the
administrative process cannot provide adequate remedies for plaintiffs’
alleged harms, rendering the administrative process futile. 225 While some
circuits apply the futility exception when plaintiffs seek programmatic relief
that a hearing officer is powerless to order, many take a narrower view. In
these circuits, courts reason that since each individual plaintiff could have
received a remedy under the administrative process, exhaustion would not
have been futile. Courts seem most comfortable applying the futility
exception to claims involving the integrity of the administrative process
itself.226
Circuits with a narrow view of the futility exception only apply it
when plaintiffs’ allegations invoke the entirety of the special education
system, calling for a complete overhaul of the program.227 The Ninth Circuit
suggests that only “truly systemic” claims that threaten the IDEA’s goals on a
“system-wide basis” warrant exceptions to the exhaustion clause.228 In order
to be “truly systemic” the remedy must require a “restructuring of the
education system itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act.”229

224 .
Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements
and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349, 395–96 (2009) (categorizing courts’ varied exceptions to the
IDEA’s exhaustion rule).
225.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); see also Wasserman, supra note 224,
at 386 (categorizing judicial applications of the futility exception).
226 .
See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158–59 (2d Cir. 1992)
(excusing exhaustion to systemic challenge of New York state’s method of appointing
hearing officers); Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88–89 (3d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing the futility exception when plaintiffs alleged that Pennsylvania’s Department
of Education failed to maintain an adequate system for resolving complaints).
227.
See J.G. ex rel. Mrs. G. v. Bd. of Educ., 830 F.2d 444, 446–47 (2d Cir. 1987)
(excusing exhaustion where a class of plaintiffs raised systemic violations including failure
to evaluate, failure to give parents notices of procedural rights, and failure to obtain
parental consent for special education services); N.M. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New
Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 851 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting exhaustion requirement where
plaintiffs’ allegations involved the entire special education program and the remedy
required the complete restructuring of the system to comply with the IDEA).
228.
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992) (cited
by T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 458 F. Supp. 3d 274, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2020) and Parent/Pro.
Advoc. League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2019)).
229.
Doe ex rel. Brockhuis v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Thus, claims that only seek to address a limited component of the system are
not “truly systemic.”230
Using this same logic, the Tenth Circuit dismissed a challenge to a
school system’s policy of assigning “arbitrarily predetermine[d]” hours of
specialized instruction, instead of individualizing services based on need.231
The court found that the claim did not meet the futility exception because it
did not “target structural or due process concerns, but rather the effect of a
single component of [the school district’s] educational program on individual
children’s IEPs.” 232 Likewise, the Third Circuit dismissed a putative class
action challenging a school district’s policy of centralizing “inclusion
classrooms” in certain elementary schools.233 There, because the claim was
limited to kindergarten students, which the court called a “small subset,” it
did not sufficiently call into question the entirety of the educational
system.234
Courts reluctant to apply the futility exception opine that the
administrative process holds some value in either its ability to help develop
facts as to each individual child’s case 235 or its ability to provide relief to
individual plaintiffs. 236 Arguably, even where the administrative process
could add some value, a purpose of the futility exception is to acknowledge
when exhaustion would simply be impractical. Recall that Congress intended
exceptions in cases where exhaustion would be futile either as a “legal or
practical matter.”237 Arguably, it is impractical to make every kindergarten
student in a school system exhaust their claim when they are all attempting
to challenge a common placement policy. Thus, some courts take a slightly

230.
Id. at 682 (citing Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305).
231.
Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1043 (10th Cir. 1993).
232.
Id. at 1044.
233.
J.T. v. Dumont Pub. Schs., 533 F. App’x 44, 54–55 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that a
putative class of kindergartners challenging the school district’s policy of centralizing
inclusion classrooms in certain elementary schools had to exhaust their individual claims
under the IDEA’s administrative remedies).
234.
Id.; see also Parent/Pro. Advoc. League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 27–
28 (1st Cir. 2019) (dismissing a putative class action brought on behalf of all students with
a mental health disability enrolled in a segregated school setting as not truly systemic
because plaintiffs failed to challenge a policy enforced at the highest administrative level
(quoting Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305)); Waters v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 191 F.3d 457, 1999
WL 528173, at *4 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to excuse exhaustion for plaintiff’s claim of
systemic failure to identify students with learning disabilities because the relief sought,
individual remedy to make plaintiff whole, did not require restructuring of the special
education program).
235.
J.T., 533 F. App’x at 54–55.
236.
Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305.
237.
121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statements of Sen. Harrison A. Williams).
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more expansive view of the futility exception, acknowledging the
impracticality of forcing a large class of students to meet exhaustion.
For example, the Second Circuit applied the futility exception to a
group of six students who claimed their school district neglected its
obligations to confer FAPE by failing to evaluate students, develop IEPs,
provide notice to parents, or provide adequate training to teachers and
staff. 238 While their allegations certainly threatened IDEA’s goals on a
“system-wide” basis,239 the court also recognized that the futility exception
was necessary because either “the framework and procedures for assessing
and placing students in appropriate educational programs were at issue, or
because the nature and volume of complaints were incapable of correction
by the administrative hearing process.”240 In short, the court acknowledged
the impracticality of forcing hundreds of students to exhaust administrative
claims. Notably, the court opined that forcing each plaintiff to exhaust before
a hearing officer would likely create inconsistent results, and that a hearing
officer had no power to order systemic relief.241 Thus, even where students
could get an individual remedy, the court affirmed the value of the
programmatic relief sought by plaintiffs.

238.
The Second Circuit found examples of allegations related to systemic
problems, such as the “failure to notify parents of meetings; its alleged failure to provide
parents with legally required progress reports; and its alleged failure to provide
appropriate training to school staff . . . [and] additional allegations of . . . failure to perform
timely evaluations.” See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 750 (2d Cir. 1987) (excusing putative class
members from exhaustion for allegations of a system-wide failure to provide adequate
psychological staff or conduct mandatory periodic evaluations of students).
239 .
See J.S., 386 F.3d at 110 (upholding a district court’s decision to excuse
exhaustion because claims centered on issues with the program itself rather than any
individual child).
240.
See id. at 111 (citing to previous cases from the Second Circuit where the
futility exception was applied); Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992)
(concluding exhaustion futile regarding a regulation implementing a state statute that
neither the hearing officer nor the Commissioner of Education had the authority to alter);
Tirozzi, 832 F.2d at 752–53 (finding exhaustion not required where issue involved the
state complaint resolution procedures); J.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Rochester City Sch. Dist.,
830 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding exhaustion not required where issue involved
settlement enforcement of class action claim); Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 867 (2d
Cir. 1982) (finding exhaustion not required in class action seeking structural reform of the
New York state and city educational systems to allow more timely evaluation and
placement of handicapped children in appropriate program).
241.
J.S., 386 F.3d at 114.
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Remarkably, the Seventh and Third Circuits heard similar putative
class claims, but only one was barred (Seventh Circuit)242 and the other was
not (Third Circuit).243 Both cases involved systemic claims alleging school
districts’ failure to provide adequate translation and interpretation services
for parents with limited English proficiency (“LEP”).244 Despite the plaintiffs’
credible allegations of systemic claims and the inability to obtain class-wide
relief at the administrative level, the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs’
allegations were not truly systemic because they involved
“fact-intensive inquir[ies] into the individual circumstances.”245 In essence,
because some LEP parents may have enough English language knowledge to
understand and participate in the IEP process without translation or
interpretation services, class-wide relief was not warranted. Taking the
opposite approach, the Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged a “system-wide policy of inaction”—the insufficient and untimely
provision of interpretation and translation services. 246 The court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs sought programmatic relief and thus, the
merits of individual remedies were irrelevant.247
Following the Third Circuit’s application of the futility exception is
consistent with Congressional intent and the purpose of the exhaustion
clause. Congress intended for claims to bypass administrative exhaustion
when futile “either as a legal or practical matter.” 248 The Supreme Court
directed courts to allow for exceptions when exhaustion would be “futile” or
“inadequate.”249 Programmatic remedies, even when they do not implicate
242.
H.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 385 F. Supp. 3d 623, 628 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (barring
the futility exception when a school did not provide written translations of IEPs and other
educational documents despite 42% of students having parents with limited English
proficiency (“LEP”)).
243.
T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 223 F. Supp. 3d 321 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (including a
putative class of students in a Philadelphia school district who alleged that the school
provided inadequate translation and interpretation services to LEP students with
disabilities and their parents).
244.
H.P., 385 F. Supp. at 627; T.R., 223 F. Supp. at 321.
245.
H.P., 385 F. Supp. at 633–35 (acknowledging that some plaintiffs, who had
exhausted other available remedies, presented evidence that hearing officers dismissed
their claims for broad relief because they did not have the authority to order programmatic
changes).
246.
T.R., 223 F. Supp. at 330 n.7 (noting that the hearing officer concluded that he
had no authority to find that the school district’s alleged practices resulted in per se
violations for similarly situated students or parents).
247.
Id. at 330.
248.
121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statements of Sen. Harrison A. Williams).
249.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988) (“It is true that judicial review is
normally not available under [the IDEA] until all administrative proceedings are
completed, but as we have previously noted, parents may bypass the administrative
process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.”).
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the entire special education system, should still be viable claims. Forcing
individual plaintiffs to exhaust remedies prior to asking for programmatic
relief serves no purpose because the administrative remedy cannot provide
the relief requested—the very definition of futility. Rather than narrow the
entryway to potential programmatic relief, courts should acknowledge—and
some have—that forcing a class of plaintiffs to exhaust administrative
remedies could individualize remedies, but would do nothing to address the
systemic policies or practices challenged.250
When courts take a narrow view of the futility exception, they
needlessly restrict plaintiffs’ access to programmatic remedies. The
restriction disproportionately affects students with disabilities trapped in
high-poverty schools. Students in these underfunded and poorly performing
schools need the promise of system-wide relief in order to have a chance at
meaningful improvements in their educational outcomes. Plaintiffs who can
substantiate claims which require a wholesale restructuring of the
educational program may be able to skate by exhaustion. But those who
cannot are needlessly turned away from the potential for systemic relief.
Narrowing the exception could unjustly exclude claims targeting access to
appropriately trained staff, quality of special education programming, or
availability of inclusive settings. Each claim has the potential to meaningfully
improve educational programs in high-poverty schools.

2. Miscalculated Class Actions
Class actions have certainly had a role in promoting positive results
for students in certain school districts. 251 But several scholars have noted
that, as a whole, class actions rarely result in improved substantive
educational programs for students in high-poverty schools.252 University of
250.
J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2004).
251.
Smith ex rel. Thompson v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 93-7044 RSWL
GHKX, 2014 WL 176677, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. L.A. Unified
Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2016), withdrawn from bound volume, opinion amended
and superseded on denial of reh'g, 830 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2016), and rev'd sub nom. Smith v.
L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing class action litigation filed
in 1993, which challenged racial disparities in special education, including
disproportionate suspensions and expulsions and violations of LRE resulting in several
consent decrees and court appointed monitors); Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 534 F.3d
683, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing a class action filed against Illinois State Board,
which raised LRE violations that resulted in a consent decree with court monitors).
252 .
Hyman et al., supra note 19; SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 130 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R.
West eds., 2009) (concluding that although class action litigation has resulted in positive
remedies for some of the nation’s largest school districts, those results are not
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Michigan Law School Professor Samuel Bagenstos categorizes class actions
into two broad types: “totality cases” and “focused cases.”253 Totality cases
seek to challenge systemic deficiencies in the broader special education
program, touching on nearly all of its operations. Focused lawsuits target
narrower conduct, seeking to resolve only a certain aspect of the broader
program. Professor Bagenstos concludes that focused cases are much more
effective in producing meaningful results 254 He finds wide-ranging the
classes, result in process-oriented remedies, ultimately, resulting in a smaller
chance of meaningful improvement for the students in the class. 255 The
remainder of this Article builds on the work of other scholars and explores
the effectiveness of class action lawsuits and putative class actions filed in
district courts over the last fifteen years.256
Between 2005 and 2020, federal courts reviewed about sixty-five
cases involving plaintiffs’ attempts to file class actions invoking the IDEA.257
The majority were filed in the Second (fifteen cases) and Third Circuits
(thirteen cases).258 Given that there are over 13,000 school districts in the
United States, it is reasonable to assume that many have not faced the
pressure of systemic advocacy in the last fifteen years.259 The total number
seems miniscule when compared to the more than seven million students
representative of the outcomes of most other class actions on this issue); Hehir, supra note
51 (concluding that class actions have had mixed results, largely helping to improve
procedural compliance, but limited in their use to reform educational practices).
253.
BAGENSTOS, supra note 252, at 130.
254.
Id. at 131–36 (contrasting two New York class actions, Jose P. and Ray M. v.
Board of Education. Jose P., a 1979 class action challenging New York City’s entire special
education program and resulting in a broad consent decree, lasted over 20 years and failed
to substantially improve outcomes for students with disabilities. Ray M. focused on the
single issue of integration of preschool students, resulting in a narrower consent decree
which lasted about four years and resulted in a 30% improvement rate of preschool
students educated in integrated settings.).
255.
Id. at 136–37.
256.
Id. at 6–10; Hehir, supra note 51, at 19–25.
257.
This dataset does not purport to represent every IDEA class action filed since
2005, but rather seeks to understand those cases that courts reviewed in some capacity.
Cases in this set were pulled from Westlaw searches for “IDEA” and “class action” and
“putative class.” Because this Article seeks to build on the work of other scholars and
acknowledges the Supreme Court’s decision in Walmart v. Dukes, which changed the
landscape of class certification, the data set is limited to cases heard after 2005. See
generally, Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 471
(2014) (analyzing Walmart’s application to special education law).
258.
See class action data set tracking IDEA class actions filed in federal courts
between 2005 and 2020 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
259.
Digest of Education Statistics: Table 214.10, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_214.10.asp
[https://perma.cc/Q7Q6-9W9J].
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who receive services under the IDEA.260 Limited resources of individuals and
the legal system’s paucity of poverty lawyers may account for the weak
showing. 261 Another reason may be the availability of the IDEA’s state
complaint process, which allows parents to request that their state
department of education investigate alleged violations of the IDEA.262
Of the class actions and putative class actions filed over the past
fifteen years, an overwhelming number focus on procedural issues. That is,
they seek remedies to fix issues of access to educational programs, rather
than target the substance of those programs. For example, several lawsuits
have been filed on behalf of students held in juvenile detention facilities
claiming a lack of special education services.263 Others were filed on behalf
of parents with limited English skills seeking improved interpretation and
translation services.264 There have also been systemic challenges to school
closures265 and to block state policies that restrict services to students who
reach the age of majority.266 A few other categories of cases challenge the
260.
Preprimary, Elementary, and Secondary Education: Students with Disabilities,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cgg
[https://perma.cc/42LN-EW5A] (noting that between 2019–20, 7.3 million, or 14% of all
public school students, received special education services under the IDEA).
261.
Hyman et al., supra note 19, at 112–13.
262.
34 C.F.R. § 300.151–.153 (2021).
263.
See V.W. ex rel. Williams v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 565 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)
(alleging violation of FAPE when children are in solitary confinement without access to
education); Wilburn v. Nelson, No. 3:17 cv-331-PPS-MGG, 2018 WL 5961724, at *194 (N.D.
Ind. Nov. 13, 2018) (alleging violation of FAPE when children are in solitary confinement);
Derrick ex rel. Tina v. Glen Mills Sch., No. 19-1541, 2019 WL 7019633, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
19, 2019) (challenging evaluation and provision of special education for students with
disabilities in detention facility); H.C. ex rel. Jenny C. v. Bradshaw, No. 18-cv-80810, 2019
WL 1051146, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019) (alleging FAPE denial for detained juveniles).
264.
See N.N. ex rel. A.N. v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 505 F. Supp. 3d 211, 211
(W.D.N.Y. 2020) (parents of students with disabilities alleged school district failed to
translate critical education-related documents into parents’ native language); T.R. v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 458 F. Supp. 3d 274, 279 (2020) (alleging school district’s provision of
translation and interpretation services is deficient); H.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 385 F. Supp.
3d 623, 623 (2019) (alleging district failed to provide adequate interpretation and
translation services).
265.
See Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, No. 12-132, 2012 WL 1473969,
*3–*4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) (alleging proposed school closure will result in a denial of
FAPE); Swan ex rel. I.O. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4047734, at*6 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 9, 2013) (alleging school closure will result in denial of FAPE); Barron ex rel. D.B.
v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 787 (8th Cir. 2011) (alleging closure of school for the
deaf will result in FAPE denial); Hernandez v. Grisham, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1044 (D.N.M.
2020) (alleging COVID-19 related school closure will result in denial of FAPE).
266.
K.S. v. R.I. Bd. of Educ., No. 14-77, 2016 WL 1065822 (D. R.I. Mar. 17, 2016);
A.R. v. Conn. State Bd. of Educ., No. 3:16-cv-01197, 2020 WL 2092650 (D. Conn. May 1,
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enforcement of due process orders,267 shortened school days,268 and limits
on related services. 269 Additionally, since 2020, several class actions have
been directed at school closures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.270
While they vary in scope, many have attempted to leverage the IDEA for
access to in-person learning. 271 But virtually none of these class actions
tackle substantive issues involving the educational program itself. This is not
to diminish the value of advocacy involving procedural issues, but it
illustrates the limits of class action advocacy to impact programmatic
changes to educational programs for students with disabilities.
Some class action lawsuits, however, have been able to leverage
procedural claims to bring about significant substantive changes to school
systems. For example, a class of students in Flint, Michigan, brought a lawsuit
against the Michigan Department of Education and their local school district
alleging that state and local educators violated the IDEA by failing to identify
students who needed special education services. 272 Plaintiffs argued that
children were at risk of developing a disability due to their prolonged
exposure to lead, and that both the state and local education authorities were
not prepared to effectively identify those students and provide them with
2020); D.J. ex rel. O.W. v. Conn. State Bd. of Educ., No. 3:16-cv-01197, 2018 WL 1461895
(D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2018); E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 728 F.3d 982, 982 (9th
Cir. 2013).
267.
LV v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 9917(RJH), 2005 WL 2298173 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2005); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); E.H. v.
Miss. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:12-CV-00474-DPJ, 2013 WL 4787354 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2013).
268.
Barr-Rhoderick ex rel. May v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., No. CIV
04-0327 MCA/ACT, 2005 WL 5629693 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2005); J.N. v. Or. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 6:19-cv-00096-AA, 2021 WL 408093 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2021).
269.
M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); S.W. ex rel.
J.W. v. Warren, 528 F. Supp. 2d 282, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); R. A-G ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 12-CV-960S, 2013 WL 3354424 (W.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013); D.C. v.
Pittsburgh Pub. Sch., 415 F. Supp. 3d 636, 645 (W.D. Pa. 2019); T.D. v. Rutherford Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., No. 3:16-cv-1488, 2017 WL 77114 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2017); Miller ex rel. S.M. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D.N.M. 2006).
270.
Martinez v. Newsom, No. 5:20-cv-01796-SVW-AFM, 2020 WL 7786543 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 24, 2020), appeal filed (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2020); Hernandez v. Lujan Grisham, 494
F. Supp. 3d 1044 (D.N.M. 2020), appeal filed (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2020); J.T. v. de Blasio, 500
F. Supp. 3d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal filed (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2020); C.M. v. Jara, No. 2:201562-JCM-DJA, 2020 WL 8671978, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2020).
271.
C.M. v. Jara, No. 2:20-1562-JCM-DJA, 2020 WL 8671978, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 10,
2020) (alleging that a Nevada district and its administrators violated students’ IDEA and
Section 504 rights by failing to offer an option other than virtual instruction at the start of
the 2020–21 school year).
272.
D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2017). Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the IDEA’s safeguards against
disciplining students with disabilities without first determining whether behavior was a
result of disability.
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appropriate special education supports and services as required under the
IDEA.273 The suit was built around the IDEA’s “child find” requirement, which
places an affirmative obligation on schools to identify students with
disabilities in need of special education. 274 Thus the claim itself did not
involve the substantive educational program, but rather the school district’s
obligation to identify students with disabilities who needed special
education and supports as part of their educational program. The parties
ultimately settled the case with the state and local education authorities
agreeing to contribute more than ten million dollars towards special
education services.275 Part of the settlement was focused on improving the
process of screening children for disabilities and ensuring high-quality
evaluations. 276 However, the settlement also included over ten million
dollars in state funding to be directed at strengthening special education
services and supports. Unfortunately, the terms regarding how that money
is to be spent are less clear. 277 Finally, the local school district agreed to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of its preschool program and review
its county-wide special education program to ensure effective delivery of
special education services.278
While effective screening and high-quality evaluations are crucial to
understanding how a disability impacts a child’s learning, ensuring a school
system has capacity to meet the needs of each child with high quality,
appropriate instruction is equally important. Because the Flint settlement
focused on improving identification and the evaluation of disability, it left
open the question of whether, and to what degree, substantive educational
instruction will change. 279 It remains to be seen whether Flint’s school
273.
D.R. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2017).
274.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).
275.
Final Settlement Agreement, D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-cv-13694AJT-APP (July 14, 2020).
276 .
Id. The settlement also included the creation of the Neurodevelopmental
Center of Excellence which will offer universal screening, in-depth neuropsychological
assessments as necessary to all children impacted by the Flint water crises.
277.
Id. Michigan agreed to contribute at least $9 million to establish the Flint
Water Crisis Special Education Fund (“SEF”) and the Genesee Intermediate School District
agreed to $1 million for transportation and an additional $1 million for staff services. “The
parameters, amount, timing and other criteria for the use, allocation and distribution of
the SEF shall be determined by written, mutual agreement of the Parties . . . .” Id. at para.
1.a. At the time of this writing, additional details regarding how settlement funds were
going to be spent were not publicly available.
278.
Id.
279.
Id. at para. 3. The settlement includes a requirement that the school district
“evaluate and make necessary modifications” to the special education program, but
provides no further instruction regarding the type of modification or outcomes to be met.

460

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[53.2

district will use funds to comprehensively ensure effective high-quality
instruction for all children with disabilities, whether integration will be a
central goal, and whether objective measurements of outcomes will be
monitored.

III. Solutions
The IDEA’s failure in high-poverty schools reflects the broader
problem of inequity in America’s public schools. And like that decades-old
problem, there are no quick fixes. However, because the IDEA has established
oversight measures which require states to regularly report back to the DOE
on a variety of indicators, there is capacity to build incentives within that
model that would encourage states to improve outcomes for students with
disabilities. The following Section explores targeted funding through a grant
system to encourage improved educational practices and outcomes. It then
discusses the possibility of increased federal enforcement by expanding the
DOJ’s role to include the independent authority to investigate and litigate
cases. Finally, it considers how class action lawsuits can be used to effectuate
programmatic change in educational practices, with the ultimate goal of
improving student outcomes.

A. Targeted Funding
Since its enactment in 1975, the IDEA has never been fully funded at
the promised 40% federal contribution level. 280 In 2019, the federal
government appropriated less than 15% of the money it had authorized
towards the IDEA.281 Yet, the law both assumes and demands a significant
level of resources to be effective. 282 Some studies indicate that educating
students with disabilities costs 90% more than educating non-disabled
students.283 Inevitably, a lack of funding has resulted in a number of patently
illegal actions designed to avoid the costs of compliance. For instance, Texas
placed a statewide cap on IDEA identification. 284 At the local level, school
districts have placed limits on hiring specialized providers, restricted
services hours, and cut specialized programs. 285 Regrettably, these illegal
280.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 20.
281.
IDEA FUNDING PRIMER, supra note 46.
282.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30 (discussing how lack of funding denies critical
resources to students with disabilities).
283.
Id. at 33.
284.
Brian M. Rosenthal, Denied: Schools Push Students Out of Special Education to
Meet State Limit, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
denied/2 [https://perma.cc/3PGS-C8M4].
285.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 46.
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actions and their negative effects disproportionately fall on poor students
because their schools are the most cash-strapped and least able to comply
with the IDEA.286
Therefore, as a first step, fully funding the IDEA would go a long way
in resolving the inequities and burdens unjustly placed on the shoulders of
low-income students of color. Improved federal funding could result in
better-trained teachers and staff, evidence-based educational programs and
specialized supports, and improved access to integrated educational
settings.287 Alternatively, Congress could take a page from President Barack
Obama’s Race to the Top grants and incentivize improved educational
outcomes through competitive grants.288 Through this initiative, the federal
government was able to develop a collaborative process through which
states sought to develop their own solutions to improve public education.289
The DOE coordinated the program and maintained considerable control in
selecting the policies that would be rewarded, as well as the oversight
measures to induce compliance.290 Though it was subject to criticism,291 the
program produced far-reaching changes to state-level education policies
based on the incentives attached to funding.292
A similar structure could target funding towards those districts that
have the highest level of need and incentivize their participation in finding
evidence-based solutions to improve student outcomes. Currently, the IDEA
requires states to monitor local school districts for compliance with the

286.
Jackson et al., supra note 8.
287.
BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 30, at 41.
288.
RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 49.
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
291.
Diane Ravitch, The Big Idea—It’s Bad Education Policy, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2010),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-14-la-oeravitch142010
mar14-story.html [https://perma.cc/RRW7-6CD6]; Seyward Darby, The New Republic:
Defending Obama’s Education Plan, NPR (July 29, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=128843021 [https://perma.cc/4G83-FWTQ]; Michele McNeil,
Civil Rights Groups Call for New Federal Education Agenda, EDUC. WK. (July 26, 2010),
https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/civil-rights-groups-call-for-new-federaleducation-agenda/2010/07 [https://perma.cc/WNK2-BT4L ] (“[L]eading civil rights
groups . . . called on U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan today to dismantle core
pieces of his education agenda, arguing that his emphases on expanding charter schools,
closing low-performing schools, and using competitive rather than formula funding are
detrimental to low-income and minority children.”).
292.
William G. Howell, Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top, 15.4 EDUC.
NEXT (July 14, 2015), https://www.educationnext.org/results-president-obama-race-tothe-top-reform [https://perma.cc/FTM9-VZH6] (“Race to the Top had a meaningful
impact on the production of education policy across the United States”).
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statute’s terms, but with minimal effect. 293 That is, federal compliance
monitoring has not had the ability to incentivize state-level change in special
education programs. 294 However, a grant-based program could encourage
states to shift their programs towards more evidence-based solutions. For
instance, education researchers Bryan Hassel and Patrick Wolf, critical of the
IDEA’s compliance model of enforcement, urge lawmakers to align incentives
with improved performance in three categories, all of which are associated
with improved student outcomes: (1) effective intervention (evidence-based
specialized instruction and support), (2) effective remediation (transitioning
students out of special education), and (3) effective prevention (ramping up
effective general education instruction and support).295 Based on research
concerning organizational motivation, they recommend including “nested
goals.” The concept is to build symbiotic goals into each layer of the structure,
beginning with individual student goals and increasing throughout the
educational system to school-level, district-level, and state-level objective
goals. 296 Ideally, goal setting should be negotiated at each level through
performance agreements that set measurable targets for annual success.297
A federal grant program could incentivize evidence-based research
on practices known to improve student outcomes and encourage the
adoption of practices known to improve organizational motivation. And,
because the IDEA already has federal oversight structures in place to monitor
a state’s use of IDEA funding,298 a grant program could quite seamlessly be
merged into this existing structure and allow for federal assistance and
monitoring of awarded grant funds and outcomes.

B. Federal Enforcement
Congress should also consider amending the IDEA to provide the
Department of Justice with the independent authority to investigate and
293 .
Bryan Hassel & Patrick J. Wolf, Effectiveness and Accountability (Part 2):
Alternatives to the Compliance Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY
309 (Chester E. Finn et al. eds., May 2001), https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/
research/rethinking-special-education-new-century [https://perma.cc/43JF-M6RH].
294.
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS, supra note 32, at 32 (finding the DOE is not holding
states accountable for their failure to uphold LRE, and instead have set targets for minimal
improvement over the years).
295.
Hassel & Wolf, supra note 293, at 320–23.
296.
Id. at 327–28.
297.
Id. at 324.
298.
The Office of Special Education Programs in the DOE is required to monitor
state compliance with the IDEA and determine when states need assistance implementing
the law or need substantial intervention. It has the authority to direct the use of state
funding, withhold funding, or refer violations to the DOJ for enforcement. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1402(a), 1416(e)(1)–(3), 1416(e)(6)(A).
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litigate cases under the IDEA. Federal enforcement of the law is necessary to
address the inequities embedded in a private enforcement scheme which
limit its usefulness for students from low-income families. Currently, the
DOE 299 monitors state compliance with the IDEA through annual
performance reports, detailing each state’s compliance with the statute
across a number of indicators, including placement, discipline, and academic
performance. 300 The greatest penalty the DOE can issue for
non-compliance is to withhold federal funds.301 Because of the enormity of
repercussions (potentially borne by students) that could occur from
withholding funds, the DOE rarely takes that step and instead focuses on
negotiating agreements for minimal state improvements to the IDEA
compliance.302 The DOE does not have any authority to investigate or resolve
individual due process complaints. While it does have the ability to refer
potential cases to the DOJ for noncompliance, but it very rarely takes that
step.303
Given the inability of many students in high-poverty schools to
leverage the IDEA for remedies, federal enforcement could prove an
important tool in forcing states and districts to face their decades-long
neglect of high-poverty schools and compel programmatic changes that
individual students could not engender alone. Further, because of the
oversight systems in place which currently require states to report a
multitude of IDEA compliance indicators to the DOE,304 it would be feasible
299.
Welcome to OSEP, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/osers/osep/index.html [https://perma.cc/P2SK-DMJU]. This Article refers to
the larger structure of the DOE for simplicity.
300.
20 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1)(A). States are required to produce annual reports that
disclose the number and percentage of children who are receiving FAPE, participating in
regular education, placed in separate classes or facilities, and subject to alternative
placements as a result of disciplinary measures. See also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2020
DETERMINATION LETTERS ON STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF IDEA (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/ideafactsheet-determinations-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HL62-4EJQ] (summarizing states’ reporting requirements under the
statute).
301.
20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(1)–(3).
302 .
JANE WEST, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS:
ADVANCING THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO LEAVE NO CHILD BEHIND 7–9 (Jan. 25, 2000),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED438632.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6HH-P3LK] (finding
that every state failed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the IDEA to some
extent and more than half failed to ensure compliance in five of the seven main compliance
areas, and that the DOE emphasizes collaboration with states through technical assistance,
corrective action plans and compliance agreements); see also SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS,
supra note 32, at 32 (finding that the DOE is not holding states accountable for their failure
to uphold LRE, and instead has set targets for minimal improvement over the years).
303.
WEST, supra note 302, at 9.
304.
20 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1)(A).
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to use this monitoring system to target school districts that were both
serving high-poverty populations and demonstrating poor educational
outcomes for students with disabilities.305 A necessary change would be to
begin collecting data on the socioeconomic status of students with
disabilities. 306 By requiring states to report the income status of students
with disabilities, DOE could help target oversight efforts towards those
school districts where private enforcement was likely being underutilized.
This would also unearth disparities in the use of special education services
by socioeconomic status.
To be successful, federal enforcement must be targeted in scope and
used in conjunction with additional federal or state funding directed towards
low-income school districts. The DOJ should be directed to prioritize
investigations on allegations of systemic violations in high-poverty school
districts. However, rather than punishing bad actors by withholding federal
dollars, a more productive strategy would be to direct failing school districts
to engage in a planning phase. In conjunction with DOE and education
experts, these planning phases could have the mission of developing a
realistic improvement plan with objectively quantifiable goals and incentives
to reach those goals. Incentives might come in the form of increasing local
control and decreasing oversight as well as transparency.307

C. Repurpose Class Actions
Class actions can remain a useful tool to help reform special
education systems, but advocates must target their efforts on substantive
systemic changes. They must shift away from challenging only procedural
issues to tackling educational practices at the school level. Advocates may be
able to leverage procedural challenges to pressure school districts into

305.
Pasachoff, supra note 19, at 1465–70 (calling for public enforcement and
offering several thoughtful proposals, including remedying information gaps and
expanding current oversight structure to include auditing the quality of IEPs in highpoverty schools as compared to wealthier school districts).
306.
Currently, data is disaggregated “by race, ethnicity, limited English proficiency
status, gender, and disability category.” 20 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1)(A).
307.
Brian P. Gill et al., Reimagining Accountability in K-12 Education: A Behavioral
Science Perspective, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 56, 56 (Apr. 2016) (“Promoting continuous
improvement in schools is likely to require multiple forms of accountability that not only
offer rewards and sanctions but also increase the transparency of educational practice and
provide mechanisms for improving practice.”).
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settlements that include larger fixes to the substance of educational
programs, but must stay keenly focused on measurable outcomes.308
Professor Thomas Hehir suggests several components to more
effective class-based strategies for educational reform. 309 First, advocates
must educate themselves on evidence-based educational practices and
promote those that are most associated with improved educational
outcomes. For example, integration is associated with better outcomes and
students with disabilities attending high-poverty schools are
disproportionately pushed into segregated settings. 310 By forcing school
districts to improve integration, advocates would increase students with
disabilities’ access to the general education curriculum and improve their
chance at better outcomes. 311 Second, settlements should focus on
data-based agreements that include easily quantifiable measurements. 312
Data that tracks the degree of integration, number of suspension days,
graduation rates, performance on standardized testing, and placement of
students in special education by race and income level may help to signal the
overall health of the educational program and can be used to objectively
measure improvements. 313 Third, advocates should also acknowledge that
true systemic reform will involve some level of capacity building and thus,
settlements should attempt to include strategies to tackle depleted
resources. Acknowledging that access to funding will be essential to shoring
up the capacity of high-poverty school districts, Hehir recommends that
class-based litigation target states, in addition to school districts, because
districts, particularly those that serve low-income populations, will need
increased funding to build capacity.
Class-based litigation remains a viable tool in pushing programmatic
reforms, but it is not enough for advocates to go after
low-hanging fruit. Rather, they must do the harder work of understanding
what programmatic changes are most closely aligned with improved student
outcomes and demand solutions that target the implementation of those
practices. They must also ensure settlements or outcomes contain
appropriate accountability measures that decentralize control and empower

308.
D.R. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2017) (alleging violations of the state’s duty to identify and evaluate students
with disabilities under the IDEA’s child find requirement, but settlement included funding
for substantive changes to the educational programs.)
309.
Hehir, supra note 51, at 837–39.
310.
Id. at 837–38.
311.
Hehir, supra note 51, at 837–38.
312.
Id. at 838.
313.
Id.
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principals, teachers, and local school boards to make necessary changes in
order to achieve set outcomes.314

CONCLUSION
The IDEA was a monumental achievement on the path towards
educational opportunity and the full inclusion of children with disabilities in
public schools. Yet, more than forty years after the original bill’s enactment,
it has not delivered on its promise. For thousands of low-income students
with disabilities who attend under-resourced public schools, the IDEA’s
rights ring hollow. The law has yet to scratch the surface of their
circumstances, leaving the programmatic deficiencies in underfunded,
high-poverty schools untouched. Its failure largely rests on internal
structures premised on the notion that public schools start from a place of
adequate resources to ensure quality regular education programming. When
that premise is shattered, the law’s protections crumble alongside it.
Fundamentally, the IDEA’s failure in high-poverty schools is
interwoven with the decades-old problem of inequity in public education.
The IDEA’s success is tied not simply to legal rules and doctrines, but also the
overall political will to adequately fund public schools. Addressing the
entirety of America’s educational inequities stretches beyond the IDEA’s
reach. But ignoring the IDEA’s role in perpetuating systemic barriers to
equitable educational opportunity is unacceptable. At a minimum, advocates
and policy makers must acknowledge the IDEA’s inequities as applied to
high-poverty schools and begin the hard work of addressing them.
Recognizing political will to fully fund the IDEA remains scarce, this
Article proposes that Congress adopt a grant program directing resources
towards high-poverty schools with the objective of incentivizing
programmatic reforms tied to educational outcomes. Given that the IDEA
already has federal funding and compliance structures in place, additional
grant funding is a feasible and efficient proposal. Advocates, too, could
continue to pressure school districts and states through class actions
lawsuits aimed at improving instructional practices. With these calculated
steps, the IDEA can move closer to its original goal of improving the lives of
all children with disabilities.
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Charles F. Sable & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1100–01 (2004).

